Lenders are reluctant to finance firms' innovation activities because such activities tend to be opaque, with a high likelihood of negative outcomes that could hamper loan repayment. We posit that public credit registries (PCRs), which play an important role in credit information sharing in many countries, can facilitate financing by reducing adverse selection and moral hazard and increasing bank competition. Using the staggered establishment of PCRs in different countries and an international firm–patent data set, we find that credit information sharing positively affects firm innovation, especially in firms that experience a larger increase in bank debt financing after the establishment of a PCR. This finding is consistent with the notion that credit information sharing promotes firm innovation by easing bank debt financing frictions. We also find a stronger effect in countries that experience a large increase in bank competition after the establishment of a PCR—consistent with increased bank competition serving as a channel through which credit information sharing facilitates bank debt financing, thereby generating a positive effect on firm innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when the established PCR has features that promote credit information sharing. It is also more pronounced for opaque firms and firms in innovation‐intensive industries, indicating that credit information sharing helps to reduce financing frictions. Finally, we posit and find evidence that firm efficiency in transforming innovation inputs into outputs improves after the establishment of a PCR. Overall, our paper offers novel insights into how credit information sharing facilitates firm innovation.

The mandatory switch from the incurred loss model to the more forward‐looking current expected credit loss (CECL) model was originally scheduled to begin in 2020. However, when the COVID‐19 pandemic started in early 2020, US regulators made the switch voluntary. Our study investigates how banks' exposure to the pandemic affects their decision to adopt CECL as well as adopting banks' pandemic‐era pattern of loan loss provisions. First, consistent with pandemic‐driven economic uncertainty reducing banks' willingness to adopt the new model, we find a negative association between banks' pandemic exposure and their CECL adoption. This association is more pronounced for banks with more lending opportunities, more lending competition, and worse loan quality. Second, compared with non‐adopters, CECL adopters report more loan loss provisions during the pandemic's early period, and less or even negative loan loss provisions during the late period. The latter scenario reflects a reversal of earlier loan loss reserves and is more pronounced for banks with more exposure to states with a higher level of vaccination, consistent with banks having a more positive economic outlook because of improving pandemic conditions. Overall, our study offers useful insights into the adoption and implementation of accounting standards during periods of economic uncertainty.

Credit information sharing allows creditors to obtain borrowers' relevant credit information, and it can improve borrowers' investment outcomes that are funded by debt. Using reforms to European countries' public credit registries (PCRs) to capture mandated information sharing among creditors, we examine the impact of such sharing on firms' investment efficiency. We find that information sharing enhances firms' investment efficiency, which we measure by their investment‐ q sensitivity. This finding is consistent with credit information sharing enabling creditors to better screen borrowers to mitigate adverse selection and enhancing borrower discipline to avoid a bad credit record, which leads to the borrower making more efficient investments. We also document that the information sharing effect is more pronounced when firms rely more on debt financing, when the shared credit information is more accessible, when firms' information environment is more opaque, and when there is a greater information monopoly in the banking system. We offer supplementary evidence that the effect is also more salient when PCRs have characteristics that suggest more effective credit information sharing. Overall, our paper offers new insight into whether and how information sharing in credit markets enhances firms' investment efficiency. More broadly, it highlights how making more borrower information available to creditors can have important economic spillover effects on firm outcomes.