Using a sample of 30,270 forecasts by 2,280 analysts under a stacked difference‐in‐differences framework involving 22 major climatic disasters in the United States, we examine the effect of climatic disasters on information production by security analysts, who play a crucial role in the financial market as information intermediaries. We find that earnings forecasts by analysts who experienced a major climatic disaster become less accurate than those by unaffected analysts within 3 months after the disaster, due to distracted attention. Disaster‐zone analysts are more likely to allocate their attention to firms of greater importance or salience, and they tend to reiterate their previous forecasts to maintain the quantity and timeliness of their forecasts. Overall, we document the real impact of cognitive bias on financial professionals' performance.

This study focuses on electric utilities in the United States to consider two related issues. First, the study tests for asymmetric price reactions to positive and negative earnings surprises (ES). Second, the study associates policy differences across jurisdictions with variations in the cash flow effects of positive and negative ES and then uses the framework to consider variations in price responses across regulatory climates. In the same context, the study investigates the effects of a utility's abnormal profits on the asymmetry of price reactions to positve and negative ES. The empirical predictions are motivated by the disparity between the principles and practices that underlie cost recovery for the utilities and the uneven effects of the cost‐recovery practies on the cash flows associated with positve and negative ES. The results show that the sign of ES and the climate in which a utility operates are related to the size of price reactions to ES. Furthermore, a utility's abnormal profit status has significant effects on the size of price reactions to ES. Only a modest price response asymmetry is indicated for manufacturing firms.

As early as 2015, financial regulators were developing disclosure frameworks aimed at enabling capital markets to price climate risks. Yet the literature on sustainability disclosure offers little insight into how regulatory agendas change, instead focusing on how nongovernmental organizations drive voluntary disclosure. To address this deficiency, this paper charts how financial regulators came to embrace climate risk, analyzing how an array of non‐state initiatives became coordinated in highlighting climate‐related impairment risks. This coordination is conceptualized via scholarship on decentered regulation, allowing a first, theoretical, contribution by constructing and demonstrating one analytical approach to studying substantive change on sustainability. This paper draws on a 25‐month participant observation of a United Nations standard‐setting project, supported by semi‐structured interviews. This allows a second, empirical, contribution by mapping how an accounting device, the so‐called “carbon budget” (the maximum amount of cumulative greenhouse gas emissions that limits the probability of exceeding 2°C of warming to 20%), coordinated this array of non‐state action toward resolving a core trade‐off: if we burn our current fossil fuel reserves, we will exceed our warming targets. The paper then shows how these coordinated efforts pressured regulatory authorities to intervene on how finance affects and is affected by climate change.

When evaluating the potential financial effects of climate change, investors demand disclosures of the climate‐related risks and opportunities that companies need to manage. We examine how and why management control over climate change performance affects investors' evaluations of such disclosures. In a series of experiments, we find that investors believe that managerial optimism is beneficial and, thus, are more willing to invest when climate‐related disclosures focus on opportunities rather than risks. This effect, however, occurs only when management has high control over the company's future climate change performance. When that control is low, investors believe that managerial realism is beneficial and, thus, are more willing to invest when these disclosures focus on risks rather than opportunities. Our study has implications for companies and standard setters considering the consequences of focusing on either risks or opportunities in climate change reporting and the conditions under which one focus or the other may be beneficial.