We examine auditor switching conditional on the compatibility of clients and their auditors using a unique text‐based measure of similarity of financial disclosures. We find clustering of clients within an audit firm based on this measure. We find that clients with the lowest similarity scores are significantly more likely (9.4%–10.6%) to switch auditors, and will change to an audit firm to which they are more similar. Regarding the effect on audit quality, we find that discretionary accruals are lower when similarity is higher. However, accounting restatements are more likely when text disclosures that are unaudited—business description, and management discussion and analysis (MD&A)—are more similar. We find no such similarity effect for the audited footnotes. Finally, we find that firms that are more similar are less likely to receive a going concern opinion (GCO), but the GCO reporting decision is more accurate. It is unclear if this reflects higher or lower audit quality since firms that are candidates for a GCO are intrinsically different from the average firm in an auditor's portfolio due to their financial distress. One implication of these results is that auditors might have greater involvement in the quality of the text disclosures that are currently not audited.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has expressed concern about the informativeness of firms’ Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) disclosures. A firm's MD&A is potentially uninformative if it does not change appreciably from the previous year after significant economic changes at the firm. We introduce a measure for narrative disclosure—the degree to which the MD&A differs from the previous disclosure—and provide three findings on the usefulness of MD&A disclosure. First, firms with larger economic changes modify the MD&A more than those with smaller economic changes. Second, the magnitude of stock price responses to 10‐K filings is positively associated with the MD&A modification score, but analyst earnings forecast revisions are unassociated with the score, suggesting that investors—but not analysts—use MD&A information. Finally, MD&A modification scores have declined in the past decade even as MD&A disclosures have become longer; the price reaction to MD&A modification scores has also weakened, suggesting a decline in MD&A usefulness.