Knowledge that Transforms

While numerous studies in accounting and finance are devoted to predicting firm-specific earnings and understanding the forecasting behavior of analysts and management, it is unclear whether or how accounting information at the micro level can be applied to the macroeconomy. Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fischer [2012], henceforth BBF, are part of a growing literature that seeks to address this question. BBF document that firm-specific management forecast releases are significantly positively associated with announcement-window aggregate stock market returns and further show that this significant market reaction is concentrated among “bellwether” firms. In this discussion, I argue that although BBF provide convincing evidence on the presence of timely macroeconomic information in management earnings forecasts, the exact nature of this information is somewhat of a black box. BBF’s results also raise the question of how the macroeconomic information content of management earnings forecasts differs from that of realized earnings. The answers to these questions can help reconcile the significantly positive association between management forecast surprises and aggregate stock returns with the previously documented negative relation between realized earnings surprises and aggregate stock returns.

Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re‐evaluate the “leveling‐the‐playing‐field” rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand, this narrows the information gap between informed and uninformed traders and improves liquidity of firm shares. On the other hand, this reduces the informational feedback from the stock market to real decisions. This tradeoff determines the optimal disclosure policy. The model explains why firm value can be higher in an environment that simultaneously promotes disclosure and private information production and why growth firms are endogenously more opaque than value firms.

This study investigates the implicit financial incentives of individual Big 4 audit partners by examining the association between a partner's compensation and characteristics of the audit firm, audit partner, and individual partner clientele for Big 4 firms in Sweden. Using tax and financial data for individual audit partners and clients, our empirical findings indicate that there is significant variation in the implicit determinants that are associated with compensation across the Big 4. We find that audit partners’ compensation is positively associated with the size of their clientele or the number of publicly traded clients, both of which represent revenue‐generating opportunities. Similarly, compensation and developing an industry specialization are positively related. In three firms, gaining clients is clearly related to an increase in compensation, while losing a client is associated with a reduction in partner income in only one firm. We find that audit partner income is more sensitive to performance‐related incentives, such as attracting new clients, as partners progress in their career. Finally, we find evidence that audit failures, proxied by reporting errors related to issuing a going concern opinion, are associated with lower compensation. These results should be of interest to the auditing profession, audit firms, and regulators when they consider the effects of implicit incentives of partner compensation on audit quality.

This paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the risk of future adverse price changes created by the anticipated arrival of information influences risk‐averse investors’ trading decisions in institutionally imperfect capital markets. Specifically, I examine how the selling activity of individual investors immediately following an earnings announcement is influenced by the tradeoff between risk‐sharing benefits of immediate trade and explicit transaction costs imposed on such trades. Consistent with my theoretically derived predictions, I find that investors’ current trading decisions are less sensitive to the incremental transaction costs created by short‐term capital gains taxes on trading profits, as both the duration and intensity of the risk of future adverse price changes increase. This evidence is consistent with an incremental cost to investors that results from the revelation of precise information, which is commonly referred to as the Hirshleifer Effect.

A substantial literature investigates conditional conservatism, defined as asymmetric accounting recognition of economic shocks (“news”), and how it depends on various market, political, and institutional variables. Studies typically assume the Basu [1997] asymmetric timeliness coefficient (the incremental slope on negative returns in a piecewise‐linear regression of accounting income on stock returns) is a valid conditional conservatism measure. We analyze the measure's validity, in the context of a model with accounting income incorporating different types of information with different lags, and with noise. We demonstrate that the asymmetric timeliness coefficient varies with firm characteristics affecting their information environments, such as the length of the firm's operating and investment cycles, and its degree of diversification. We particularly examine one characteristic, the extent to which “unbooked” information (such as revised expectations about rents and growth options) is independent of other information, and discuss the conditions under which a proxy for this characteristic is the market‐to‐book ratio. We also conclude that much criticism of the Basu regression misconstrues researchers’ objectives.

We conduct an experiment to examine the effects of guidance frequency (frequent vs. infrequent) and guidance goal (accuracy vs. meet/beat vs. truthful) on managers’ operating decisions. We find that frequent guiders sacrifice total earnings for quarterly earnings predictability irrespective of their guidance goals. Furthermore, when guidance is infrequent, guiders with accuracy goals opt for quarterly earnings predictability over total earnings more often than do guiders with either meet/beat goals or truthful goals. These findings have implications for regulators and investors in terms of the unintended consequences of requesting frequent earnings guidance. Further, while managers may perceive that accuracy goals can help their firms establish forecasting and reporting reputations, we show that accuracy goals may result in dysfunctional internal managerial decisions, particularly when guidance is issued infrequently.

This study explores motivations underlying managers’ resource adjustments. We focus on the impact of incentives to meet earnings targets on resource adjustments and the ensuing cost structures. We find that, when managers face incentives to avoid losses or earnings decreases, or to meet financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, they expedite downward adjustment of slack resources for sales decreases. These deliberate decisions lessen the degree of cost stickiness rather than induce cost stickiness. The results suggest that efforts to understand determinants of firms’ cost structures should be made in light of the managers’ motivations, particularly agency‐driven incentives underlying resource adjustment decisions.

We use the EU stress tests and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis to study the consequences of supervisory disclosure of banks’ sovereign risk exposures. We test the idea that a mandatory one‐time disclosure induces an increase in voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk in the following periods and, through the shift in the voluntary disclosure equilibrium, increases the liquidity of banks’ shares. First, we find that the timing and content of different mandatory disclosure events helps explain the levels of stress‐test banks’ voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk. Second, although the bid‐ask spreads of stress test participants generally increased after the mandatory stress test in 2011, our results suggest that the decrease in market liquidity is entirely attributable to those stress‐test participants that did not commit to voluntarily maintaining the disclosures of sovereign risk exposure.

Social psychologists have documented a tendency for people to overestimate their similarity to others. I investigate whether financial analysts' forecast errors are consistent with this bias. I model the bias by assuming analysts overestimate the correlation of the private signals they receive about a firm's future earnings. My model predicts a positive relationship between (i) the likelihood of an analyst's revised forecast being too close to his earlier forecast and (ii) the number of analysts issuing forecasts during the time interval between his two forecasts. I empirically confirm this prediction and consider several alternative explanations.

We investigate whether management's decision regarding the recognition of the valuation allowance (VA) for deferred tax assets provides incremental information about the persistence of accounting losses. We introduce a classification scheme that assigns loss firm‐years into three categories based on whether management appears to have recognized a material change in the VA, and whether or not the firm has positive taxable income (e.g., a net operating loss). The results of our study show that our tax categories contain information about the persistence of accounting losses over the following three years beyond variables previously identified to predict loss persistence. This incremental information is consistent with management using private information about the firm's future prospects in setting the VA. Finally, we find that investors’ pricing of the VA varies with the saliency of the tax signal and the information environment of the firm.