We examine how the market power of credit rating agencies (CRAs) affects their rating standards. Using a global sample across 26 countries from 1994 to 2019, we find that greater market power of global CRAs, measured by their country-level market shares, is associated with stricter corporate ratings. In addition, the increase in global CRAs' market shares contributes to the tightening trend in their credit ratings worldwide. Exploiting the NRSRO designation of local CRAs in Japan, we find that global CRAs issue more inflated ratings following a decline in their market power. Further, global CRAs' greater market power is associated with timelier ratings, fewer missed defaults, but more false warnings. Collectively, our findings suggest that global rating agencies' market power leads to stricter rating standards and timelier ratings by strengthening the agencies’ reputation concerns, but at the expense of increased false warnings.

This discussion makes several observations regarding the past 25 years of China-related accounting research reviewed in Lennox and Wu (2022). First, we discuss factors of supply and demand that led to the rise of China-related studies and how this growth has contributed to the internationalization of accounting research. We note that the taxonomy of the literature by geographic region rather than topic or methodology is unusual and makes it difficult to formulate a common framework that would help organize the many contributions. Next, we distill distinct patterns in authorship, choice of topics, and asserted contributions of China-related studies. Studies are increasingly shaped by the availability of new data and regulatory reforms. These features should be interpreted carefully, as most reforms are interconnected and reflect the purposeful outcome of a tightly controlled economy. As a result, issues of generalizability arise. Alternatively, researchers could embrace the China setting and strive to identify the local institutional forces that make it special. We see such a more institutional, context-specific view of China-related—or better—international research as an opportunity for the field. We close by presenting five broad themes we view as promising areas for future China-related research.

We examine how directors’ reputations are managed through disclosure choices. We focus on disclosures in the director biographies filed with the SEC. We find that a directorship on another board is more likely to be undisclosed when the other firm experienced an adverse event—such as an accounting restatement, securities litigation, or bankruptcy—during the director's tenure. Withholding such information is associated with a more favorable stock price reaction to the director's appointment and the loss of fewer subsequent directorships. These findings suggest that reputation concerns lead to strategic disclosure choices that have real consequences in capital and labor markets.

We examine how firms respond to requests for enhanced disclosure that we make on an online investor platform. Exploiting variation in firms' customer and supplier disclosures, we ask a randomized set of non-disclosing firms to provide information on their customers' and suppliers' identities. We find that the firms' probability of disclosure depends on the basis we give for the demand—requests appealing to disclosure's usefulness to investors lead to more frequent disclosure, while those appealing to regulators' preference for disclosure lead to less frequent disclosure. The requests we make on the platform lead to more frequent customer- and supplier-related inquiries from other platform users. We also find that the treatment firms' disclosure of customer and supplier information improves in the next period's regulatory filings. The findings suggest that investor platforms can enhance corporate transparency by increasing retail investors' ability to demand information.