Individuals’ stock market participation depends on the risk-return trade-off they expect to achieve. We find that the expected economic benefits of investing are highly heterogeneous. We define the personal equity risk premium (PERP) as the difference between an individual's expectation of returns and personal opportunity cost of capital. Higher PERP is associated with greater stock market participation. Our results hold after we control for known factors, such as financial literacy, trust, and loss aversion, and are stronger for the level of stock investment. Disentangling PERP shows that both components help explain both stock market participation and the level of participation.

We study incremental capital structure decisions of Dutch companies. From 1977 to 1996 these companies have made 110 issues of public and private seasoned equity and 137 public issues of straight debt. Managers of Dutch companies are entrenched. For this reason a discrepancy exists between managerial decisions and shareholder reactions. Confirming Zwiebel [American Economic Review (1996) 1197–1215] we find that Dutch managers avoid the disciplining role of debt allowing them to overinvest. However, the market reactions show that this overinvestment behavior is recognized. We do not find a confirmation of the adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf [Journal of Financial Economics (1984) 187–221]. This is probably due to the entrenchment of managers and the prevalence of rights issues.

This study investigates the announcement effects of offerings of convertible bond loans and warrant-bond loans using data for the Dutch market. The event study analysis shows that announcement effects of convertible bonds are associated with positive but insignificant abnormal returns and that announcements of warrant-bonds are associated with significant positive abnormal returns. These findings are similar to the results for Japanese hybrid debt, as reported by Kang et al. (1995) (Kang, J.K., Kim, Y.C., Park, K.J., Stulz, R.M., 1995. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pp. 257–270) and Kang and Stulz (1996) (Kang, J.K., Stulz, R.M., 1996. Review of Financial Studies, pp. 109–139), but they contrast with studies for the United States that generally find significant negative abnormal returns for convertible bond loans and insignificant negative abnormal returns for warrant-bond loans. Our results cannot be attributed to differences in the corporate governance structures of the Netherlands and the United States. We find that the positive abnormal returns for the warrant-bond loans are caused by the packaging of the announcements with other (good) firm-specific news.

We study wealth effects for a sample of 156 spin-offs from 15 different European countries that were announced between January 1987 and September 2000. The cumulative average abnormal return over the 3-day event window is 2.62%. This number increases to 2.66% for the subsequently completed spin-offs. The cumulative average abnormal return is 3.57% for completed spin-offs by companies that increase their industrial focus and only 0.76% for non-focus increasing companies. The difference between these two sub-samples is significantly different from zero. These results are in line with previous studies for the US. The long-run returns in excess of matching firms are mostly insignificant for parents, subsidiaries and pro-forma combined firms. This result suggests that, unlike US spin-offs, European spin-offs are not associated with long-run superior performance.

We examine the role of award-winning CEOs in corporate innovative activities. We find no significant difference in innovation outputs between firms of media award-winning CEOs and a matched sample of predicted winners. However, firms headed by winners of non-media awards generate significantly more patents and citations in the second and third year after the award. Firms led by CEO-winners of media awards attract more interest in Google and see an increase in the number of financial analysts that follow them. These effects likely exert more pressure on managers to meet short-term goals and hence impede the firms’ innovation. We do not find the same effects for firms that have CEOs who win non-media awards. The latter category sees an improvement in employee treatment following the award year. These different channels explain why innovation only increases for firms that are headed by CEOs who win non-media awards.

While convertible offerings announced between 1984 and 1999 induce average abnormal stock returns of −1.69%, convertible announcement effects over the period 2000–2008 are more than twice as negative (−4.59%). We hypothesize that this evolution is attributable to a shift in the convertible bond investor base from long-only investors towards convertible arbitrage funds. These funds buy convertibles and short the underlying stocks, causing downward price pressure. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the differences in announcement returns between the Traditional Investor period (1984–1999) and the Arbitrage period (2000–September 2008) disappear when controlling for arbitrage-induced short selling associated with a range of hedging strategies. Post-issuance stock returns are also in line with the arbitrage explanation. Average announcement effects of convertibles issued during the Global Financial Crisis are even more negative (−9.12%), due to a combination of short-selling price pressure and issuer, issue, and macroeconomic characteristics associated with these offerings.