A number of recent papers examine the relationship between default risk and equity returns, and the results are mixed. These studies employ different measures of default risk and we find that correlations between eight diverse measures of default risk tend to be less than 50%. Nonetheless, we find that the relationship between stock returns and diverse measures of default risk tends to be consistent; default risk is a significant determinant of stock returns and this relationship is “hump backed”, as predicted by Garlappi and Yan (2011).

Using data from 20 OECD countries, we find that firms with greater organization capital have significantly higher stock returns and that this represents an international phenomenon. We also find new evidence that the positive association between organization capital and stock returns increases with labor market flexibility. This finding is consistent with greater labor mobility and competition in flexible labor markets rendering organization capital investment riskier from the shareholders’ perspective.

We find that managers receive more risk-taking incentives in their compensation packages once their firms are referenced by credit default swap (CDS) trading, particularly when institutional ownership is high and when firms are in financial distress. These findings provide suggestive evidence that boards offer pay packages that encourage greater risk taking to take advantage of the reduced creditor monitoring after CDS introduction. Further, we show that the onset of CDS trading attenuates the effect of vega on leverage, consistent with the threat of exacting creditors restraining managerial risk appetite.

This paper provides new evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism. We find that director abnormal compensation has a negative impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover and reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor stock performance. However, for firms with greater institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced. These findings suggest that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is likely associated with agency problems.