We propose a new class of risk measures which satisfy convexity and monotonicity, two well-accepted axioms a reasonable and realistic risk measure should satisfy. Through a nonlinear weight function, the new measure can flexibly reflect the investor’s degree of risk aversion, and can control the fat-tail phenomenon of the loss distribution. A realistic portfolio selection model with typical market frictions taken into account is established based on the new measure. Real data from the Chinese stock markets and American stock markets are used for empirical comparison of the new risk measure with the expected shortfall risk measure. The in-sample and out-of-sample empirical results show that the new risk measure and the corresponding portfolio selection model can not only reflect the investor’s risk-averse attitude and the impact of different trading constraints, but can find robust optimal portfolios, which are superior to the corresponding optimal portfolios obtained under the expected shortfall risk measure.

In empirical corporate finance, firm size is commonly used as an important, fundamental firm characteristic. However, no research comprehensively assesses the sensitivity of empirical results in corporate finance to different measures of firm size. This paper fills this hole by providing empirical evidence for a “measurement effect” in the “size effect”. In particular, we examine the influences of employing different proxies (total assets, total sales, and market capitalization) of firm size in 20 prominent areas in empirical corporate finance research. We highlight several empirical implications. First, in most areas of corporate finance the coefficients of firm size measures are robust in sign and statistical significance. Second, the coefficients on regressors other than firm size often change sign and significance when different size measures are used. Unfortunately, this suggests that some previous studies are not robust to different firm size proxies. Third, the goodness of fit measured by R-squared also varies with different size measures, suggesting that some measures are more relevant than others in different situations. Fourth, different proxies capture different aspects of “firm size”, and thus have different implications. Therefore, the choice of size measures needs both theoretical and empirical justification. Finally, our empirical assessment provides guidance to empirical corporate finance researchers who must use firm size measures in their work.

The dynamic minimum variance hedge ratios (MVHRs) have been commonly estimated using the Bivariate GARCH model that overlooks the basis effect on the time-varying variance–covariance of spot and futures returns. This paper proposes an alternative specification of the BGARCH model in which the effect is incorporated for estimating MVHRs. Empirical investigation in commodity markets suggests that the basis effect is asymmetric, i.e., the positive basis has greater impact than the negative basis on the variance and covariance structure. Both in-sample and out-of-sample comparisons of the MVHR performance reveal that the model with the asymmetric effect provides greater risk reduction than the conventional models, illustrating importance of the asymmetric effect when modeling the joint dynamics of spot and futures returns and hence estimating hedging strategies.

We investigate an alternative economic channel of a positive relationship between risk and compensation, as documented by Cheng et al. (2015). We propose that when information asymmetry exists, firms generally seek to use compensation as a signal of their CEOs’ ability. The risks arising from information asymmetry tend to encourage firms to pay higher compensation to their CEOs in a pattern of financial incentives we call the “Lake Wobegon effect”. However, when individual firms pursue complete signaling, a higher equilibrium compensation level can be achieved. This paper explores the factors that give rise to the “Lake Wobegon effect” and the learning process by which this effect can be counterbalanced over time (Hayes and Schaefer, 2009).

Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) is one of the most controversial and least understood governance tools. Using manually collected voting data for all director types at Chinese listed firms, we provide the first evidence for the impact of D&O insurance on directors’ voting decisions and the subsequent effects on corporate governance and financial performance. We find that independent directors at firms carrying D&O insurance are more likely to dissent when benchmarked against their peers in the same firm on the same proposal. Our results are robust to endogeneity checks. We identify channels through which the incentive effects of D&O insurance operate. We also find that the positive effect of D&O insurance on independent director dissension is associated with better firm performance and monitoring outcomes, including less litigation and lower claim values, less underinvestment, better internal control quality, and improved CEO pay- and turnover-performance sensitivities.

This study investigates the underexplored role of onsite viewing activities in the housing search process. By incorporating buyer heterogeneity into the housing search model of Courant (1978), we show that buyers with higher private valuations tend to view more properties onsite and ultimately pay higher prices. Utilising a proprietary dataset from the largest real estate agency in Beijing, our analysis reveals that increased onsite viewings significantly enhance both the likelihood of a transaction and the final purchase price. We establish causality by employing an instrumental variable approach that leverages exogenous variations in heavy pollution and rainfall, which hinder buyers’ ability to conduct onsite house viewings. More intensive onsite viewings raise transaction price as they reveal a buyer’s higher private valuation to the seller. Besides, onsite viewings also function through reducing information asymmetry and improving match quality.

Siblings are important sources of support. Male siblings, in particular, are valuable extended family resources in patriarchal societies such as China. This paper examines the effects of the number of brothers on household stock market participation in China. We find that having more brothers increases both the probability of stock market participation and the portfolio share in stocks. This positive effect is more pronounced for individuals who face high income risk, suffer from poor health, lack private insurance, and reside in areas with low financial development and high gender discrimination. In addition, the brother effect persists in recent periods. This evidence highlights the importance of informal risk-sharing networks in household investment decisions. Our results imply that demographic changes such as fertility decline might have unnoticed but sizable impacts on household portfolio choice, especially in countries with strong family ties.