The purpose of this study of small firms is to compare the process of internationalization in traditional manufacturing companies with corresponding processes in companies oriented toward innovation. Case studies were conducted in six small Nordic companies: three conventional and three innovative. The underlying concept of the conventional companies is strictly production oriented. Investment in engineering workshops and an effective organization for production constitute their most important strategy. In the innovative companies the production equipment is relatively easy to move, and over the years these companies have changed the location of production plants a number of times. The basic meaning of technology also differs in the two categories of industries. The conventional companies are based on an established technology that can be purchased through well-known market channels. In the innovative companies the process of developing new products or serving as intermediary between research organizations and end users demands close contact with people and organizations close to the technological core of the industry. The conventional companies are incorporated into a multidimensional industrial system of suppliers, competitors, and other companies, and the individual companies within these industries are constrained by the rules dictated by these networks. The innovative companies all have a concentrated product scope, which implies that it is relatively easy to achieve efficiency in various functions such as R&D, production, and marketing activities. This clear distinction between functions has been advantageous to the process of internationalization. The conventional companies have characteristics typical of family-controlled companies, i.e., the management team consists of a handful of people often closely associated with the owner family. The observation on the industry level that the game is governed by some very rigid rules is also evident on the management level, where the significant people are always kept within narrow limits. The individuals in the innovative companies have a very high level of education; they work in teams together with partners from other companies and/or organizations and they adhere to high professional demands. The results from these six case studies indicate that the internationalization process must be understood in the context of the industry, company, and people involved. International trade and cooperation will most certainly increase. Therefore it is important to observe that the conditions for industries and single companies are different. Conventional companies have a natural local concentration that ultimately implies different strategies from the innovative companies who have a global focus.
Prior research examining whether venture capital firms (VCs) add value to the ventures in their portfolios by advising their new venture teams (NVTs) has led to inconclusive results. Whereas most prior studies have assumed that NVTs value VC assistance, this study tests for the possibility that they differentially value two different types of VC assistance-business management and operational. We collected data by surveying 837 firms identified in the Venture Capital Journal that had received financing from venture capital firms. Only firms that received first-round financing were included in our analysis, which reduced our sample size to 205 firms. Our central finding is that systematic differences exist among NVTs in their evaluation of learning assistance from VCs. Even though VCs can chose their own level of involvement with an NVT, successfully improving venture performance through nonfinancial assistance at least partially depends upon the extent to which the NVT values VC input. Our results indicate that NVTs with more industry experience and longer team tenure in the current venture are negatively related to both business management advice and operational assistance offered by their VCs. However, when an NVT has previously worked together and when its primary experience is from another industry, it tends to welcome business management advice from its VC. One interpretation of this finding is that an advanced level of operational specialization already exists in such a team, which reinforces established operating patterns. Changing established operating patterns could make it more costly to adopt VC input on operational issues. However, business management advice may be more welcome, because the NVT is still learning how to compete in a new industry. These findings add to the growing literature that suggests that VCs play a particularly important role in entrepreneurial ventures when they pursue the development of new technologies (Ehrlich et al. 1994; Sapienza 1992). However, business management advice is not highly valued by NVTs that pursue more technical innovations. These findings in combination with those of Sapienza and Amason (1993) suggest that conflict in the VC-NVT relationship may be the greatest when the parties attempt to resolve critical differences, which ironically appear to be the ones where the NVT could derive the greatest benefit from listening to its VC. Finally, current firm performance is not related to the NVT's evaluation of VC assistance. Although cross-sectional measures of performance have obvious limitations, particularly with new ventures, these results indicate that the NVT evaluation of VC assistance is not driven by short-term performance. Past research has shown that VCs vary widely in their preferred level of involvement with the managers of firms in their portfolio. Some VCs prefer a laissez-faire approach, whereas others think that they must be more involved if they are to ultimately receive high rewards. The central finding from this study is that significant differences exist among NVTs in their evaluation of business management and operational assistance. For VCs that are more involved, these findings suggest that the optimal level of involvement is also partially contingent upon the NVTs openness to learning. Ignoring the contingent nature of the VC-NVT relationship, VCs could reduce their influence as a tool to improve firm performance and to ensure the ultimate survival of the venture.
Over the last 25 years, franchising has exploded internationally. A 1992 survey by the International Franchise Association reported that one-half of the franchisors without foreign units planned to expand internationally, and 93% of those with international operations intended to increase the size of their international operations (IFA 1992). The growth in global franchising has created a pressing need to better understand the capabilities needed to franchise internationally (Shane 1996a, Shane 1996c). However, a fundamental problem for the entrepreneur is how to balance the ever-increasing demands and constraints on his or her time and contend with the increasing spatial dispersion of operations (Norton 1988b). The development of such capabilities is not, however, an easy task. Lack of experience in key areas and entrepreneurial capacity problems constrain the ability of franchisors to acquire much needed skills. Consequently, this paper has two main objectives. First, it discusses specific capabilities of the international franchisor identified in franchising research and ties them to the administrative efficiency and risk management theories. Second, it integrates these capabilities into a two-dimensional framework of international franchisor types based on the dynamic capabilities perspective of resource-based theory (Barney 1991; Conner 1991; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1990; Mahoney 1993). This study proposes that the combination of existing capabilities and the capacity to develop new skills produce four general types of international franchisors. This article makes two principal contributions. First, for researchers in international entrepreneurship, this framework supports the contention (Shane 1996a) that the capabilities needed to franchise internationally are different from those required in the domestic context. This suggests that an important aspect of success internationally may depend on the entrepreneur's awareness of the need to develop skills and capabilities that are outside his or her areas of expertise. Second, for franchisors the inclusion of international contextual variables in this framework should help identify which specific capabilities are needed for successful international expansion. In addition, the dynamic aspect of capability development also helps to understand the variation in approaches among international franchisors. The development of international franchising capabilities is not a one-time event but requires learning and relearning over the lifetime of the franchisor.
The rapid internationalization of markets for venture capital is expanding the funding alternatives available to entrepreneurs. For venture capital firms, this trend spells intensified competition in markets already at or past saturation. At issue for both entrepreneurs and venture capital firms is how and when venture capitalists (VCs) can provide meaningful oversight and add value to their portfolio companies beyond the provision of capital. An important way VCs add value beyond the money they provide is through their close relationships with the managers of their portfolio companies. Whereas some VCs take a very hands-off approach to oversight, others become deeply involved in the development of their portfolio companies. Utilizing surveys of VCs in the United States and the three largest markets in Europe (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France), we examined the determinants of interaction between VCs and CEOs, the roles VCs assume, and VCs' perceptions of how much value they add through these roles. We examined the strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles through which VCs are involved in their portfolio companies, and we analyzed how successful such efforts were. By so doing we were able to shed light on how and when VCs in four major markets expend their greatest effort to provide oversight and value-added assistance to their investment companies. Consistent with prior empirical work, we found that VCs saw strategic involvement as their most important role, i.e., providing financial and business advice and functioning as a sounding board. They rated their interpersonal roles (as mentor and confidant to CEOs) as next in value. Finally, they rated their networking roles (i.e., as contacts to other firms and professionals) as third most important. These ratings were consistent across all four markets. VCs in the United States and the United Kingdom were the most involved in their ventures, and they added the most value. VCs in France were the least involved and added the least value; VCs in France appeared to be least like others in terms of what factors drove their efforts. Our theoretical models explained a greater proportion of variance in governance and value added in the United States than elsewhere. Clear patterns of behavior emerged that reflect the manner in which different markets operate. Among the European markets, practices in the United Kingdom appear to be most like that in the United States. Determinants of Governance (Face-to-Face Interaction) We operationalized VC governance or monitoring of ventures as the amount of face-to-face interaction VCs had with venture CEOs. We found some evidence that VCs increase monitoring in response to agency risks, but the results were mixed. Lack of experience on the part of CEOs did not prompt significant additional monitoring as had been predicted. A more potent determinant was how long the VC-CEO pairs worked together; longer relationships mitigated agency concerns and reduced monitoring. Contrary to expectations, perceived business risk in the form of VCs' satisfaction with recent venture performance had little impact on face-to-face interaction. Monitoring was greatest in early stage ventures, indicating that VCs respond to high uncertainty by increased information exchange with CEOs. We measured two types of VC experience and found different patterns for the two. Generally speaking, VCs with greater experience in the venture capital industry required less interaction with CEOs, whereas VCs with greater experience in the portfolio company's industry interacted more frequently with CEOs than did VCs without such experience. Determinants of Value Added We argued that VCs would most add value to ventures when the venture lacked resources or faced perceived business risks, when the task environment was highly uncertain, and when VCs had great investing and operating experience. Contrary to expectations, VCs added most value to those ventures already performing well. As we had predicted, VCs did add relatively more value when uncertainty was high: e.g., for ventures in the earliest stages and for ventures pursuing innovation strategies. Finally, we found that VCs with operating experience in the venture's focal industry added significantly more value than those with less industry-specific experience. These results are consistent with anecdotal evidence that entrepreneurs have a strong preference for VCs with similar backgrounds as their own. We found no evidence that experience in the venture capital industry contributed significantly to value added. Together, these results suggest that investigations of the social as well as economic dimensions of venture building may prove a fruitful avenue for future study. Overall, the results showed that value-added is strongly related to the amount of face-to-face interaction between VC-CEO pairs and to the number of hours VCs put in on each individual venture. Implications for Venture Capitalists The competition for attractive investments is heating up as economies become more globalized. Thus, the pressure on venture capital firms to operate both efficiently and effectively is also likely to build. It is as yet unclear whether the recent trend toward later stage, safer investments will continue, and how those venture capital firms following this path can differentiate themselves from other sources of capital. Venture capital firms that are able to choose the appropriate bases for determining governance effort and the appropriate roles for delivering added value to their portfolio companies will be those most likely to survive. In the largest, most robust markets (i.e., the United States and the United Kingdom), more effort is expended by venture capitalists to deliver something of value beyond the money. This suggests that the tradeoff preferred by those succeeding is to be more rather than less involved in their investments. Our results indicate that VCs clearly economize on the time they devote to involvement in their portfolio companies. However, our results also indicate that they do this at the great peril of producing value insufficient to justify the cost of their product. Implications for Entrepreneurs Our findings provide two important insights for entrepreneurs. First, they show that where and when they obtain venture capital is likely to have an impact on the extent and nature of effort delivered by their venture capital investors. It appears that on average entrepreneurs receiving venture capital in the United States and the United Kingdom will be more closely monitored and will receive more value-adding effort from their VCs than will those in France or the Netherlands. Needless to say, entrepreneurs should consider their preferences for level and type of involvement from their investors as they consider their choice of partners. In France, for example, VCs put great emphasis on their financial role in comparison with other roles, but they contribute much less than VCs elswhere via other strategic, interpersonal, and networking roles. The second key implication of our findings is that entrepreneurs may be able to gauge what roles VCs will see as most important, when VCs are more or less apt to become involved in their companies, and when they believe they can most add value. Such knowledge may help CEOs anticipate VC activity, be aware of the parameters of VCs' preferences, communicate their own preferences, and negotiate the timing and extent of interaction. For example, although our results indicate that geographic distance significantly limits face-to-face interaction, it appears to have less impact on the amount of value added. Implications for Researchers Much more can be learned about the relative efficiency and effectiveness of alternative governance arrangements. Little is known about how formal structures such as contract covenants and board control work in conjunction with informal oversight and interaction. Even less is known about how value is added and how it is best measured. Although this study took a step toward developing a model of the circumstances under which value is added, the theory and its operationalization await further development.
A key to success in industries populated by entrepreneurial high-technology firms is the rate at which the firm develops new products. Rapid product development creates significant advantages for entrepreneurial firms, including access to early cash flows, external visibility, legitimacy, and early market share. The higher a firm's rate of new product development, the more likely the firm is to achieve and maintain these first-mover advantages. This is particularly true in industries such as pharmaceuticals, where the effectiveness of patent protections leads to patent races in which a “winner take all” scenario exists. But even in industries where patent protection is weak, the advantages of being first, in terms of market preemption, reputation effects, experience curve effects, etc., can still be of major importance. We argue that one way an entrepreneurial firm can increase its rate of new product development is by entering into strategic alliances with firms that possess complementary assets. The basic proposition advanced is that a firm's rate of new product development is a positive function of the number of strategic alliances that it has entered. However, the relationship between strategic alliances and the rate of new product development may be nonlinear. Specifically, although strategic alliances may initially have positive effects on the rate of new product development, this relationship may exhibit diminishing returns. Moreover, past some point it is possible that negative returns may set in. Thus, the relationship between the number of alliances and the rate of new product development may be an inverted U-shape. Two reasons can be given to support such a relationship. First, not all alliances will make an equal contribution to increasing the rate of new product development. The economic “law” of diminishing returns suggests that the more alliances a firm engages in, the more likely it is to enter some alliances whose marginal contribution is relatively minor. Such a phenomenon on its own is enough to suggest diminishing returns. Second, gaining access to complementary assets through strategic alliances is not without risks. Malperformance may occur when the firm discovers that the complementary assets provided by the partner are a poor match, fail to live up to the promises made by the partner, or a partner may opportunistically exploit an alliance, expropriating the firm's know-how while providing little in return. These problems arise because the effectiveness with which the firm can select and manage alliance partners is likely to be negatively related to the number of alliances the firm is managing. Due to information processing requirements, the quality of partner search and the ability to monitor the partners' actions will decline as the firm increases the number of alliances in which it is involved. This reasoning leads to a prediction that past some point, alliances will be increasingly vulnerable to malperformance. This raises not only the possibility of diminishing returns to the number of alliances, but also negative returns as the number of alliances increases past some critical point. This proposed relationship between alliances and new product development was tested on a sample of 132 biotechnology firms. The results provide strong evidence to support the inverted U-shaped relationship between the number of strategic alliances and the rate of new product development. Therefore, at low levels strategic alliances are positively related to new product development, but as the number of alliances increases, the benefits begin to decrease, and at high levels the costs of an additional alliance actually outweigh the benefits.
Contractual terms guide many entrepreneur-franchisees' actions with the franchisor. However, it is impossible for franchisors to completely specify all future actions. They compensate by continually attempting to influence franchisees, using what franchisees perceive as suasion in their ongoing interactions. We develop a theoretical framework for understanding the informal interaction dynamics between franchisors and franchisees. Most franchise arrangements include the payment of royalties based on sales. This encourages a growth-oriented strategy, usually appropriate for the franchisees during the initial stages of their operations. Whereas a franchising strategy can reduce entreprenerial risk for franchisees, it does not eliminate it. Thus, as sales of the franchisees increase, profit-oriented strategies will be favored because they represent the payoffs that accrue to continuing entrepreneurial effort and risk-taking. These strategies may be in opposition to franchisors' sales orientation when market conditions do not allow continual growth without margin penalties. A research model is developed, depicting the relationship between franchisees' strategies and performance, and the moderating effect that contractual goals and franchisees' perception of franchisors' attempts at suasion have on this relationship. A set of research hypotheses was then empirically tested using a large sample of franchisees from the commercial truck retailing industry. The results indicate that sales-growth and profit-growth goals are not always congruent. Balancing the goals of the franchisor and franchisee did not appear to be a popular option; either one or the other was emphasized. More importantly, the results indicate that when franchisees perceive attempts by franchisors to use suasion, lower levels of profits result, but there is no corresponding increase in the level of sales. In the long-term, franchisors are likely to determine that current contractual arrangements are not protecting their longer term interests. Thus, they will be expected to attempt to modify franchise contracts in ways that force franchisees to implement sales-gain strategies. This will require that entrepreneur-franchisees anticipate future events more carefully at the time they are examining the original franchise contract. Because most entrepreneurs are concerned with immediate survival at the start-up stage, this makes examination of the contract less likely to happen; the franchise option is attractive because it reduces such risks. We recommend that entrepreneurs write ex ante contingent claims contracts that ensure a gradual reduction of franchisor influence. Although this would assume a power or knowledge balance that favors the franchisees, which is unlikely during the start-up phase, it will change over time as franchisees gain a better understanding of the local competitive dynamics. Thus, it may well serve the franchisees to take a defensive posture or push a royalty arrangement that decreases the emphasis on sales over time. This is most likely to be effective where the entrepreneur is considering several competing franchises at the time of the signing of the contract. Finally, we recommend that entrepreneur-franchisees should not assume that the expert advice offered by their franchisor is always in their best interests. Although technical advice is more likely to be unbiased and should be fully exploited, as this is what makes the franchise valuable, strategic advice, or that which relates to goal setting may well be colored by the financial interests of the franchisor. Franchisors are unlikely to consider the possibility that franchisees would be better served by formulating their own strategies, nor are they likely to consider that the franchise network would be better off, in the longer term, by the collective impact associated with numerous franchisees independently formulating their own strategies. In short, although we do not suggest that franchisees should always assume that “crossing mother” is the best response to all perceived franchisor-suasion efforts, they should carefully examine all strategic advice.
Entrepreneurs in a number of retailing sectors have eschewed the creation of company-owned chains and have embraced franchising as a preferred method for growing their businesses. There have been two leading reasons proposed for this preference. First, that franchisees provide the financial capital necessary for expansion, and second that franchisees manage the outlets better than company employees would if the unit were company owned. Interestingly, although many entrepreneur/franchisors confirm the relevance of the capital acquisition argument in their decision-making, theoretical analysis has discounted its importance. Instead, researchers have focused on the incentives of employee store-managers to misrepresent their ability and their effort as the dominant impetus behind franchising. Misrepresentation by employees as to ability and effort imposes costs and inefficiencies on the entrepreneur's chain. Arguing that franchising solves these problems by having the stores managed by persons with claims to the profits, these researchers have, by and large, rejected the capital acquisition argument for franchising in favor of this incentive-based rationale. Within this view, multi-unit franchising presents a curious anomaly. Multi-unit franchising, either through the incremental expansion by the franchisee one unit at a time or through the rights to open multiple units contained in an area development agreement, creates a collection of mini-chains within the franchise system. These mini-chains are operated by employee store-managers. Of course, they are employees of the franchisee, but they are employees nonetheless, and as franchise researchers have traditionally argued regarding the entrepreneur's employees, they will have incentives to misrepresent their ability and effort. Moreover, multi-unit franchising is ubiquitous. If multi-unit franchising is at odds with the incentive rationale for franchising, and it has a positive association with the growth of franchise systems, it must be providing the entrepreneur with some other benefit. In this study, we argue that the benefit it provides is access to capital. Through a study of fast-food franchise systems, we demonstrate that the more a chain engages in multi-unit franchising (i.e., the greater the proportion of multi-unit franchisees it has), the faster it grows, even faster than franchise systems generally. Moreover, we show that the level of commitment franchisors feel toward continuing to franchise is negatively related to the average number of units per franchisee and negatively related to their ability to obtain financial capital elsewhere. In other words, although multi-unit franchising helps an entrepreneur grow his or her business by providing increased access to capital, store level incentive problems get increasingly troublesome as franchisees get more and more units. It would appear, therefore, that capital acquisition is a relevant reason for engaging in franchising after all.
This research analyzed new venture start-up activities undertaken by 71 nascent entrepreneurs. Nascent entrepreneurs are individuals who were identified as taking steps to found a new business but who had not yet succeeded in making the transition to new business ownership. Longitudinal data for the study comes from a secondary data analysis of two representative samples, one of 683 adult residents in Wisconsin (Reynolds and White 1993) and the other of 1016 adult residents of the United States (Curtin 1982). These surveys were conducted between 1992 and 1993, and the nascent entrepreneurs were reinterviewed six to 18 months after their initial interview. Three broad questions were addressed: (1) What activities do nascent entrepreneurs initiate in attempting to establish a new business? (2) How many activities do nascent entrepreneurs initiate during the gestation of the start-up? and (3) When are particular activities initiated or completed? Between the first and second interview, 48% of the nascent entrepreneurs reported they had set up a business in operation. Over 20% had given up and were no longer actively trying to establish a business. Almost a third of the respondents reported they were still trying to establish a firm. As a way to summarize the results and as a springboard toward some insights into the implications of this research for practice and future research, we developed the following activity profiles of the three types of nascent entrepreneurs studied. These profiles are offered as a combination of both fact and some intuition about the findings. STARTED A BUSINESS. Nascent entrepreneurs who were able to start a business were more aggressive in making their businesses real. They undertook activities that made their businesses tangible to others: they looked for facilities and equipment, sought and got financial support, formed a legal entity, organized a team, bought facilities and equipment, and devoted full time to the business. Individuals who started businesses seemed to act with a greater level of intensity. They undertook more activities than those individuals who did not start a business. The pattern of activities seem to indicate that individuals who started firms put themselves into the day-to-day process of running an ongoing business as quickly as they could and that these activities resulted in starting firms that generated sales (94% of the entrepreneurs) and positive cash flow (50% of the entrepreneurs). What is not known is how successful or profitable these new firms will be over time. For example, 50% of the firms that were started had not reached positive cash flow and these firms may have been started by individuals who were foolhardy and rushed into operation of a business that would not be sustainable. GAVE UP. The pattern of activities for the group of entrepreneurs who gave up seem to indicate that these entrepreneurs discovered that their initial idea for their businesses would not lead to success. The finding that the activity of developing a model or prototype differentiated individuals who gave up from those who were still trying would suggest that those who gave up had “tested” their ideas out and found that they would not work according to their expectations. Nascent entrepreneurs who gave up seemed to be similar in their activity patterns compared with those who started their firms, that is, individuals who gave up pursued the activities of creating a business in an aggressive manner at the beginning of the process. But as the business unfolded over time, these entrepreneurs decreased their activities and then ceased start-up activities. This group of individuals might be seen as either having the wisdom to test their ideas out before jumping into something that might lead to failure or lacking the flexibility to find more creative ways to solve the problems that they were confronted with. STILL TRYING. It would seem that those who are still trying are not putting enough effort into the start-up process in order to find out whether they should start the business or give up. Those still trying had undertaken fewer activities than individuals in the other two groups. The still trying entrepreneurs were devoting their short-term efforts toward activities internal to the start-up process (e.g., saving money and preparing a plan) and less effort toward activities that would make the business real to others. The still trying entrepreneurs may be all talk and little action. Or these still trying entrepreneurs might be involved in developing businesses that take longer for these particular opportunities to unfold. (It should be noted that there was no industry effect across the three groups.) Our advice to individuals considering business start-up is that the results seem to provide evidence that nascent entrepreneurs should aggressively pursue opportunities in the short-term, because they will quickly learn that these opportunities will either reveal themselves as worthy of start-up or as poor choices that should be abandoned. Individuals who do not devote the time and effort to undertaking the activities necessary for starting a business may find themselves perennially still trying, rather than succeeding or failing. What entrepreneurs do in their day-to-day activities matters. The kinds of activities that nascent entrepreneurs undertake, the number of activities, and the sequence of these activities have a significant influence on the ability of nascent entrepreneurs to successfully create new ventures. This study suggests that the behaviors of nascent entrepreneurs who have successfully started a new venture can be identified and differentiated from the behaviors of nascent entrepreneurs who failed. We believe that future studies will more precisely identify the kinds of behaviors appropriate for certain new venture conditions. If such contingency information can be generated, entrepreneurship research is likely to have significant benefits for entrepreneurship practice, education, and public policy.
This article first presents a review of the development of different types of domestic enterprises: state-owned enterprise (SOEs), collectiveowned enterprises (COEs), and other enterprises (OEs), which include mainly private enterprises. Compared with other transition economies, COEs are actually an important source of China's rapid economic growth. They are “vaguely defined cooperativeŝ without a well-defined ownership structure. There is no equivalent organizational structure similar to COEs in Western economies. The purpose of this article is to study the empirical relationship between the size of domestic enterprises including state-owned enterprises, collective-owned enterprises, and other enterprises and their firm dynamics (growth) by investigating whether they grow according to Gibrat's Law. The majority of COEs and OEs were formed after the economic reform. The rapid growth of these non-state enterprises, especially COEs, is actually the driving force behind the rapid development of the industrial sector. Our empirical results suggest that Gibrat's Law does not hold for all types of enterprises (the rejection is especially strong for COEs). Moreover, small enterprises are growing faster than their larger counterparts in terms of employment and output. This conclusion leads to (at least) three implications: (1) There has been little research into the dynamics of SOEs and COEs in an economy in transition. Our results not only help stimulate further research in this area but also provide information for designing policies to speed up the economic reforms. (2) Until now, the Chinese government has not had a comprehensive small business policy. Given our empirical results, there is an implication for government policy prescription. To achieve China's development targets of rapid industrialization and lower unemployment or underemployment, the Chinese economy can reap more dynamic benefits by breaking up a giant and inefficient enterprise (especially inefficient SOE) into a number of smaller enterprises. In addition, more small enterprises also improve competition in the marketplace and force other inefficient SOEs to improve their performance. Further research should be undertaken to examine the viability of this policy. (3) Because COEs are the majority of small manufacturing enterprises, the rapid growth of COEs (after their formation) that are simply the opposite of the type of private organizations, the center of the Central and East European reforms, is rather surprising to academics. Although some hypotheses like “cooperative culturê and “moral framework for rights are put forward to explain their superior performance, the validity of such hypotheses has not been empirically tested yet. This is a fruitful area for further research.
Although many scholars, business experts, and government agencies enthusiastically advise all firms, including new and small ventures, to internationalize, such advice does not appear to be based on empirical evidence. Few researchers have empirically examined the link between new venture performance and the internationalization of new ventures. At best, the evidence suggests that there is no significant relationship. We used a sample of 62 U.S. new venture manufacturers in the computer and communications equipment industries during the late 1980s. These industries were purportedly globalizing and may have been leading other industries into increased international operations. We found that higher levels of internationalization (percentage of foreign sales to total venture sales) were associated with higher relative market share two years later. However, there was no significant direct relationship between percentage of international sales and subsequent return on investment (ROI). Perhaps international operations simply cost more than expected. Or perhaps, as MacMillan and Day (1987) found in their study of corporate ventures over a 4-year time period, increases in market share may be a prelude to higher ROI as scale benefits translate into higher profitability. However, the 2-year time period of our study may simply not be long enough for investments in higher market shares to produce improved profits. During the 2-year study period, many of the ventures changed their level of internationalization. Of the 36 ventures who were domestic (no international sales) in the prior study, 10 expanded into international markets over the 2 years. Of the 26 originally international ventures (international sales of at least 5%), half increased their percentage of international sales, nine reduced it, and four stayed the same. Whereas the average change in international sales percentage of the ventures was only 2.9 percentage points, the large standard deviation of 13.0 percentage points, and the leptokurtic distribution (9.2) reflected the dramatic changes made by some of the ventures. Using subgroup analysis we examined these changes in percentage of international sales in conjunction with changes in strategies and performance. Ventures that had increased international sales, relative to those that had not, exhibited more positive associations between the degree of strategic change and performance as measured in terms of both relative market share and ROI. Increased international sales in technology-based new ventures seems to require simultaneous strategic changes in order to positively impact venture performance. This study is a follow-up to McDougall's (1989) finding that technology-based new ventures that had sales in foreign markets had significantly different strategies than similar ventures that sold their products only domestically. The current study enriches the previous findings by adding consideration of (1) changes in degree of internationalization, (2) changes in strategy, and (3) venture performance. Although we found no performance penalty associated with increasing international sales alone, indiscriminant advice for new ventures to sell in foreign markets without other supporting strategic actions is inconsistent with our findings. Internationalization, alone, did not lead to increased profitability. Entrepreneurs of young technology-based firms who are considering internationalization should take heed of our results. Internationalization of sales does not appear to be a simple matter of applying established strategies and procedures developed for a domestic arena. Successful internationalization appears to require changes in the venture's strategy as well.