D. D. Hester, Aspects of Monetary and Banking Theory and Moral Hazard: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 37, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Meeting of the American Finance Association, Washington, D.C., December 28-30, 1981 (May, 1982), pp. 395-397

This paper studies the term structure of real rates, expected inflation, and inflation risk premia. The analysis is based on new estimates of the real term structure derived from the prices of index-linked and nominal debt in the U.K. I find strong evidence to reject both the Fisher Hypothesis and versions of the Expectations Hypothesis for real rates. The estimates also imply the presence of time-varying inflation risk premia throughout the term structure.

A new empirical model for intertemporal capital asset pricing is presented that allows both time-varying risk premia and betas where the latter are identified from the dynamics of the conditional covariance of returns. The model is more successful in explaining the predictable variations in excess returns when the returns on the stock market and corporate bonds are included as risk factors than when the stock market is the single factor. Although changes in the covariance of returns induce variations in the betas, most of the predictable movements in returns are attributed to changes in the risk premia.

Duffie (1996) examines the theoretical impact of repo “specials” on the prices of Treasury securities and concludes that, all else the same, an issue on special will carry a higher price than an otherwise identical issue. We examine this hypothesis and find strong evidence in support of it. We also examine whether the liquidity premium associated with “on-the-run” issues is due to repo specialness and find evidence of a distinct effect. Finally, we investigate whether auction tightness and percentage awarded to dealers are related to subsequent specialness and find that both variables àre generally significant.

Darrell Duffie (1996) examines the theoretical impact of repo 'specials' on the prices of Treasury securities and concludes that, all else the same, an issue on special will carry a higher price than an otherwise identical issue. The authors examine this hypothesis and find strong evidence in support of it. They also examine whether the liquidity premium associated with 'on-the-run' issues is due to repo specialness and find evidence of a distinct effect. Finally, the authors investigate whether auction tightness and percentage awarded to dealers are related to subsequent specialness and find that both variables are generally significant.

Duffie (1996) examines the theoretical impact of repo “specials” on the prices of Treasury securities and concludes that, all else the same, an issue on special will carry a higher price than an otherwise identical issue. We examine this hypothesis and find strong evidence in support of it. We also examine whether the liquidity premium associated with “on‐the‐run” issues is due to repo specialness and find evidence of a distinct effect. Finally, we investigate whether auction tightness and percentage awarded to dealers are related to subsequent specialness and find that both variables àre generally significant.

There is a natural separation between production decisions affecting the firm as a whole and individual decisions by each shareholder about his portfolio of securities. The end result of these two types of decisions is normally referred to as a productive exchange equilibrium. At such an equilibrium, no individual wants to adjust his portfolio and no firm can muster majority support for a change in its production plans. This paper presents a partial theory of takeover bids in that it examines the role of a takeover bid as a mechanism by which a simultaneous change in shareholdings and production plans can be achieved. This enables a new production exchange equilibrium to be reached which is preferred by a majority of the shareholders but which is inaccessible without a contingent contract in the form of a takeover bid.

There is a natural separation between production decisions affecting the firm as a whole and individual decisions by each shareholder about his portfolio of securities. The end result of these two types of decisions is normally referred to as a productive exchange equilibrium. At such an equilibrium, no individual wants to adjust his portfolio and no firm can muster majority support for a change in its production plans. This paper presents a partial theory of takeover bids in that it examines the role of a takeover bid as a mechanism by which a simultaneous change in shareholdings and production plans can be achieved. This enables a new production exchange equilibrium to be reached which is preferred by a majority of the shareholders but which is inaccessible without a contingent contract in the form of a takeover bid.