Sports betting markets offer a novel laboratory to test theories of cross‐sectional asset pricing anomalies. Two features of this market—no systematic risk and terminal values exogenous to betting activity—evade the joint hypothesis problem, allowing mispricing to be detected. Examining a large and diverse set of liquid betting contracts, I find strong evidence of momentum, consistent with delayed overreaction and inconsistent with underreaction and rational pricing. Returns are a fraction of those in financial markets and fail to overcome transactions costs, preventing arbitrage from eliminating them. An insight from betting also predicts value and momentum returns in U.S. equities.

Financial regulation was as hotly debated a political issue in the 19th century as it is today. We study the political economy of state usury laws in 19th century America. Exploiting the wide variation in regulation, enforcement, and economic conditions across states and time, we find that usury laws when binding reduce credit and economic activity, especially for smaller firms. We examine the motives of regulation and find that usury laws coincide with other economic and political policies favoring wealthy political incumbents, particularly when they have more voting power. The evidence suggests financial regulation is driven by private interests capturing rents from others rather than public interests protecting the underserved.

This paper documents a strong and prevalent momentum effect in industry components of stock returns which accounts for much of the individual stock momentum anomaly. Specifically, momentum investment strategies, which buy past winning stocks and sell past losing stocks, are significantly less profitable once we control for industry momentum. By contrast, industry momentum investment strategies, which buy stocks from past winning industries and sell stocks from past losing industries, appear highly profitable, even after controlling for size, book‐to‐market equity, individual stock momentum, the cross‐sectional dispersion in mean returns, and potential microstructure influences.

The strong bias in favor of domestic securities is a well‐documented characteristic of international investment portfolios, yet we show that the preference for investing close to home also applies to portfolios of domestic stocks. Specifically, U.S. investment managers exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms, particularly small, highly levered firms that produce nontraded goods. These results suggest that asymmetric information between local and nonlocal investors may drive the preference for geographically proximate investments, and the relation between investment proximity and firm size and leverage may shed light on several well‐documented asset pricing anomalies.

The strong bias in favor of domestic securities is a well‐documented characteristic of international investment portfolios, yet we show that the preference for investing close to home also applies to portfolios of domestic stocks. Specifically, U.S. investment managers exhibit a strong preference for locally headquartered firms, particularly small, highly levered firms that produce nontraded goods. These results suggest that asymmetric information between local and nonlocal investors may drive the preference for geographically proximate investments, and the relation between investment proximity and firm size and leverage may shed light on several well‐documented asset pricing anomalies.

We examine the impact of short selling by conducting a randomized stock lending experiment. Working with a large, anonymous money manager, we create an exogenous and sizeable shock to the supply of lendable shares by taking high loan fee stocks in the manager's portfolio and randomly making available and withholding stocks from the lending market. The experiment ran in two independent phases: the first, from September 5 to 18, 2008, with over $580 million of securities lent, and the second, from June 5 to September 30, 2009, with over $250 million of securities lent. While the supply shocks significantly reduce market lending fees and raise quantities, we find no evidence that returns, volatility, skewness, or bid–ask spreads are affected. The results provide novel evidence on the impact of shorting supply and do not indicate any adverse effects on stock prices from securities lending.

We provide new evidence on the success of long-run risks in asset pricing by focusing on the risks borne by stockholders. Exploiting microlevel household consumption data, we show that long-run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross-sectional variation in average asset returns than aggregate or nonstockholder consumption risk, and implies more plausible risk aversion estimates. We find that risk aversion around 10 can match observed risk premia for the wealthiest stockholders across sets of test assets that include the 25 Fama and French portfolios, the market portfolio, bond portfolios, and the entire cross-section of stocks.

This paper documents a strong and prevalent momentum effect in industry components of stock returns which accounts for much of the individual stock momentum anomaly. Specifically, momentum investment strategies, which buy past winning stocks and sell past losing stocks, are significantly less profitable once we control for industry momentum. By contrast, industry momentum investment strategies, which buy stocks from past winning industries and sell stocks from past losing industries, appear highly profitable, even after controlling for size, book‐to‐market equity, individual stock momentum, the cross‐sectional dispersion in mean returns, and potential microstructure influences.

We provide a model of the effects of catastrophic risk on real estate financing and prices and demonstrate that insurance market imperfections can restrict the supply of credit for catastrophe‐susceptible properties. Using unique micro‐level data, we find that earthquake risk decreased commercial real estate bank loan provision by 22% in California properties in the 1990s, with more severe effects in African–American neighborhoods. We show that the 1994 Northridge earthquake had only a short‐term disruptive effect. Our basic findings are confirmed for hurricane risk, and our model and empirical work have implications for terrorism and political perils.