Knowledge that Transforms

Pandemic fraud is geographically concentrated and stimulated local purchases, with effects on prices. Recipients of fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) funds significantly increased their home purchasing rate compared to recipients of non-fraudulent PPP funds, and house prices in high-fraud ZIP codes increased 5.8 percentage points more than in low-fraud ZIP codes within the same county. In a horse race, pandemic fraud is one of the largest and most robust factors explaining house price appreciation during COVID. ZIP codes with fraud also experienced heightened vehicle purchases and other consumer spending in 2020-21, with a return to normal in 2022.

This paper examines the causal role of face-to-face (F2F) interactions in generating local informational advantages for mutual fund managers. Using COVID-19 lockdowns as an exogenous shock, I show that fund managers’ performance on local stocks declined relative to distant stocks when in-person meetings were curtailed, driven by impaired investment timing rather than changes in firm fundamentals. I investigate two distinct benefits of F2F interactions arising from interpersonal cues: trust-building, which enhances the transmission of soft information, and impression management, which facilitates the transmission of favorable information. The results cannot be fully explained by changes in internal information flows or the use of public information, and are more pronounced for stocks in less transparent information environments and in regions with stronger social traits.

In a “lemons” market, a shock to gains from trade precedes the buyers’ offer. Lower gains exacerbate adverse selection. Trading with intermediaries before observing the shock commits sellers not to keep high-quality assets in such states, improving surplus despite impeding efficient use of information. To add value, intermediaries need not possess superior skills or information. If sellers choose intermediaries to overcome search frictions, traded assets’ quality and welfare increase with search costs. The theory offers a novel perspective on the underwrite-to-distribute model in leveraged loans, and predicts that dealers’ shift from market-making to match-making may worsen adverse selection in over-the-counter markets.