This paper examines the effect of several factors on the market share of investment banks that act as book managers in initial public offerings (IPOs) between 1984 and 1995. For established banks, IPO first-day returns, one-year abnormal performance, abnormal compensation, industry specialization, analyst reputation, and association with withdrawn offers have a significant impact on changes in market share. These factors have a more significant effect on market share changes in low-volume IPO markets. These factors have a less significant effect on market share, statistically and economically, for less established banks, consistent with the notion that less reputation is placed at risk.

This paper tests models of mutual fund market timing that allow the manager's payoff function to depend on returns in excess of a benchmark, and distinguish timing based on publicly available information from timing based on finer information. We simultaneously estimate parameters which describe the public information environment, the manager's risk aversion, and the precision of the fund's market-timing signal. Using a sample of more than 400 U.S. mutual funds for 1976–94, our findings suggest that mutual funds behave as highly risk averse, benchmark investors. Conditioning on public information improves the model specification. After controlling for the public information, we find no evidence that funds have significant market-timing ability.

On November 17, 1988, the board of directors of Nestlé AG decided to allow foreign investors to hold Nestlé registered stock, reversing a longstanding practice. This decision had a tremendous impact on the prices of the firm's three classes of common stock, as well as on the prices of several other corporations traded on the Zürich stock exchange. These price changes can be explained by the hypothesis that demand curves slope down.

Turner Broadcasting illustrates how organizational mechanisms can be adapted to prevent a majority owner from imposing costs on minority shareholders through inept management or opportunistic behavior. These mechanisms involve issuing preferred stock with unusual features, concentrating its ownership among a small group of investors, allowing the new preferred shareholders to elect several directors, and requiring supramajority approval of major management decisions by a reconstituted board of directors. The alienability of the preferred stock is restricted to help insure that its ownership stays concentrated and in the hands of those with the specific knowledge and incentives to be effective monitors.

In a multivariate regression model relating individual returns to the market return, CAPM implies non-linear restrictions on the parameters. Several asymptotically valid tests of these restrictions have been suggested. The existing Monte Carlo evidence shows that some of these tests are unreliable for reasonable sample sizes, but does not indicate well which tests are reliable. This paper reports the results of an extensive Monte Carlo experiment. Shanken's CSR test and Jobson and Korkie's corrected likelihood ratio test are quite accurate in all cases we consider.

The expected market return is a number frequently required for the solution of many investment and corporate finance problems, but by comparison with other financial variables, there has been little research on estimating this expected return. Current practice for estimating the expected market return adds the historical average realized excess market returns to the current observed interest rate. While this model explicitly reflects the dependence of the market return on the interest rate, it fails to account for the effect of changes in the level of market risk. Three models of equilibrium expected market returns which reflect this dependence are analyzed in this paper. Estimation procedures which incorporate the prior restriction that equilibrium expected excess returns on the market must be positive are derived and applied to return data for the period 1926–1978. The principal conclusions from this exploratory investigation are: (1) in estimating models of the expected market return, the non-negativity restriction of the expected excess return should be explicity included as part of the specification: (2) estimators which use realized returns should be adjusted for heteroscedasticity.

The validity of the classic Black-Scholes option pricing formula depends on the capability of investors to follow a dynamic portfolio strategy in the stock that replicates the payoff structure to the option. The critical assumption required for such a strategy to be feasible, is that the underlying stock return dynamics can be described by a stochastic process with a continuous sample path. In this paper, an option pricing formula is derived for the more-general case when the underlying stock returns are generated by a mixture of both continuous and jump processes. The derived formula has most of the attractive features of the original Black-Scholes formula in that it does not depend on investor preferences or knowledge of the expected return on the underlying stock. Moreover, the same analysis applied to the options can be extended to the pricing of corporate liabilities.

I provide evidence that investors overweight analyst forecasts by demonstrating that prices do not fully reflect predictable components of analyst errors, which conflicts with conclusions in prior research. I highlight estimation bias in traditional approaches and develop a new approach that reduces this bias. I estimate characteristic forecasts that map current firm characteristics into forecasts of future earnings. Contrasting characteristic and analyst forecasts predicts analyst forecast errors and revisions. I find abnormal returns to strategies that sort firms by predicted forecast errors, consistent with investors overweighting analyst forecasts and predictable biases in analyst forecasts influencing the information content of prices.

CalFed Bancorp is one of 126 S&Ls suing the U.S. government for breach of contract related to supervisory goodwill, a form of goodwill created by the acquisition of insolvent thrifts during the early 1980s. Before a determination of damages in its lawsuit, CalFed announced and issued a litigation participation security giving shareholders a proportional claim on recovered damages, if any. This announcement generated a positive excess return in part because it made CalFed a more likely acquisition target. Trading in the security also reveals important, yet previously unavailable, information about CalFed's lawsuit: its price reveals a market-based estimate of damages while its beta reveals information regarding expected returns and trial duration. In a broader context, this paper identifies acquisition facilitation as a benefit of issuing targeted stock and highlights a series of lawsuits that will set important precedents regarding the determination of liability and the estimation of damages in breach of contract cases.