Knowledge that Transforms

We study gender differences in on-time loan payment responsiveness to collection mechanisms using randomized dunning text messages sent to 17,545 FinTech borrowers. Reminder text messages significantly reduce delinquency rates relative to a no-message control, with messages incorporating social or financial incentives proving more effective. Women are more responsive to social pressure, while men are more sensitive to financial incentives. These results are robust to observable control variables and matching methods. Channel analyses indicate that gender differences in responsiveness to the existence and size of the incentive explain the observed gender differences under the social incentive treatment. However, only gender differences in sensitivity to the existence of incentives explain the gender difference in financial incentive treatments. These findings inform practitioners and policymakers that some seemingly gender-neutral practices may create unintended gender disparities in financial markets.

Despite surging environmental laws, how their enforcement influences banks' management of climate risks remains underexplored.Using the Brazilian Amazon as a laboratory, we examine the impact of a shock to environmental law enforcement capacity on bank management of risks arising from deforestation-a significant but understudied climate risk.After enforcement declined, Brazilian banks significantly altered their priorities to more short-term profitability over longerterm risk concerns.Banks greatly increased lending to agribusinesses engaged in deforestation and actively shifted resources to regions with higher deforestation potential.Results suggest that without rigorous enforcement, banks may fail to fully internalize deforestation risks, despite existing environmental laws.

We evaluate the joint impact of structural liquidity regulation and unconventional monetary policy on Eurozone banks’ lending. Using an extensive bank-level quarterly dataset from 2008 to 2020, we study the introduction of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) under Basel III and the European Central Bank’s Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) and Targeted LTROs (TLTROs). We find that while the NSFR had no effect on aggregate lending, it led to an increase in short-term lending and a reduction in long-term lending, consistent with lower maturity transformation. LTRO participation is associated with higher medium- and long-term lending, and our results indicate that this effect is conditional on banks’ structural liquidity positions: banks with rising NSFRs were able to use LTRO and TLTRO funding to sustain long-term credit supply. These findings suggest that central bank liquidity interventions can mitigate the adjustment costs of tighter liquidity regulation during the transition period, enabling banks close to regulatory compliance to maintain longer-maturity lending.

Using earnings conference calls, we investigate banks’ views of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to understand why TARP generated so few loans. We find that banks generally regarded TARP favorably and many mentioned using TARP funds to make loans. However, actual loan growth fell well below expectations based on prior capital ratios, even among banks that publicly committed to lending. Other banks highlighted that the funds would improve their capital ratios. We show that these perspectives are largely unrelated to banks’ ex-ante financial characteristics, but instead reflect the evolving conditions during the crisis period. These shifts are consistent with a large decline in the fraction of banks that commented on the favorable pricing of the preferred stock over time. Our findings suggest that banks primarily used TARP funds to strengthen capital ratios, partly driven by CEO career concerns. Weak loan demand and evolving market conditions also contributed to the sluggish loan growth following the TARP injections.

We construct a novel panel of insider ownership for roughly 600 U.S. bank holding companies from 2003 to 2014 to test whether ownership structure shaped recapitalizations around the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Insider ownership shows no discrete shift around the GFC. Using a difference-in-differences design with BHC and time fixed effects, we find that, after Q3 2008, banks with higher pre-crisis insider stakes issued significantly less common equity than otherwise similar peers. This effect is more pronounced where insiders enjoy greater private benefits of control, as proxied by insider lending and earnings opacity—consistent with dilution reluctance as the mechanism. The findings hold in propensity score matched regressions and when employing instrumental variables for insider ownership. These results reveal that ownership structure affects banks’ equity issuances in crises, underscoring the importance of accounting for ownership structure in bank stress tests and capital-regulation frameworks.

• How does product market competition affect corporate environmental footprint? • We examine restructuring of U.S. electric utilities, the number one emissions-intensive sector. • Cost-cutting actions are the key driver of changes in operations and emissions of electric plants. • Cost-cutting actions lower environmental footprint when plant technology allows greener production. • Without such technology, competition worsens environmental outcomes. Banks face pressure to integrate a wider range of risks into lending decisions, including both traditional product-market risks and the increasingly important environmental risk. Yet how these two types of risk interact remains unclear. We show that production technology is pivotal in shaping the impact of product-market competition on environmental risk. Focusing on the restructuring of the US electric utility industry, which introduced product-market competition into a highly polluting sector, we find that technological capacity is key. When technology enables cost-saving production decisions that also improve environmental performance, competition reduces environmental footprint. Otherwise, it exacerbates it. These findings suggest that lenders must assess not only individual risk factors of borrowers but also their potential interactions, with firms’ technological capacity playing a crucial role.