This paper analyzes the market for syndicated loans, a hybrid of private and public debt, which has grown at well over a 20% rate annually over the past decade and which totaled over $1 trillion in 1997. We identify empirically the factors that influence a bank or nonbank's decision to syndicate a loan and the determinants of the proportion of the loan sold in the event of syndication. The evidence reveals a loan is more likely to be syndicated as information about the borrower becomes more transparent, as the syndicate's managing agent becomes more “reputable”, and as the loan's maturity increases. The lead manager holds larger proportions of information-problematic loans in its own portfolio. Loan syndications, like loan sales, appear to be motivated, in part, by capital regulations, and the liquidity position of the agent bank influences the likelihood of syndication, but not the extent. Our results confirm that information and agency problems affect the salability of debt claims and the extent to which a loan is “transaction oriented” rather than “relationship oriented” in the sense of A. Boot and A. Thakor (2000, J. Finance54, 679–713). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G20, G21, G24.

This paper examines the effects of macroeconomic announcements on equity index markets using high frequency transactions data for the regular and E-mini S&P 500 index futures contracts. For ten types of announcements that significantly affect prices, we analyze the price adjustment process and the trading patterns of exchange locals and off-exchange customers around the announcements. We find a large increase in trading activity immediately after the announcement. The results also show that during this initial surge in trading activity, locals are able to time their trades better than off-exchange traders even when locals do not have the advantage of access to the order flow. The trading strategy followed by exchange locals in the first 20 seconds after the announcement tends to be profitable, while off-exchange traders tend to make losing trades over the same time period. These results lend evidence that local traders tend to react to the macroeconomic information faster than off-exchange traders.

Over the past decade, the distances between small businesses and their bank lenders have increased substantially, as increasing numbers of bank lenders have implemented credit-scoring models to evaluate the creditworthiness of small businesses. These developments are antithetical to the traditional small business lending process, which emphasizes local proximity, bank–borrower relationships, and qualitative information. We theoretically model and empirically test whether and how these changes have affected the probability that small business loans default, using 1984–2001 data from the SBA's flagship lending program. On average, both distance and credit scoring are associated with higher default probabilities—the former suggests that distance interferes with information collection, while the latter suggests that production efficiencies encourage credit-scoring lenders to expand output by making riskier loans at the margin. The default-increasing effects of distance are substantially dampened at credit scoring banks, however, suggesting that hard-information lending approaches may outperform soft-information, relationship-based lending approaches in long-distance situations.