Knowledge that Transforms

We model optimal ethical standards, capital requirements and talent allocation in banking. Banks with varying safety-net protections, including depositories and shadow banks, innovate products and compete for talent. Managers dislike unethical behavior, but banks heed it only because detection imposes costs. We find: (i) higher capital induces higher ethical standards, but socially optimal capital requirements may tolerate some unethical behavior; (ii) managerial ethics fails to raise banks’ ethical standards; (iii) banks with lower ethical standards attract better talent and innovate more; and (iv) it is socially optimal to allocate better talent to shadow banks instead of depositories, and this allocation results in higher capital requirements and ethical standards for depositories. Consequently, with capital capacity constraints, the shadow banking sector is larger than the depository sector; talent competition induces a race to the bottom in ethical standards, and the regulator responds by setting capital requirements to magnify this size difference.

Studies find that during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, loan spreads rose and corporate lending tightened, especially for foreign borrowers (a flight-home effect). We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance (DI) made smaller reductions in total lending and foreign lending, experienced smaller increases in loan spreads, and had quicker post-crisis recoveries. These effects are more pronounced for banks heavily relying on deposit funding. Evidence also reveals that more generous or credible DI design is associated with a stronger stabilization effect on bank lending during the crisis, confirmed by the difference-in-differences analysis based on expansion of DI coverage during the crisis. The stabilization effect is robust to the use of country-specific crisis measures and control of temporary government guarantees.

Exploiting debit card and credit card transactions of a large, representative sample of consumers from a leading bank in Singapore, we examine the consumption response to an anticipated, transitory price shock generated by the nation-wide annual sale event. Consumers significantly increase their spending during the sale event. More importantly, we find inter-temporal substitution where consumers spend less immediately before the event, and cross-categorical substitution behavior where consumers decrease spending in items unaffected by the sale event. However, consumers exhibit little substitution behavior when they use credit cards or when they are liquidity constrained, highlighting the importance of heterogeneity in assessing the aggregate impact of such stimulus programs.

We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.

Funds with performance fees have annual net risk-adjusted returns of 0.50% below other funds, a result mostly due to funds without a stochastic benchmark against which performance is measured and funds with a benchmark that is easy to beat. For other funds, there is no evidence of underperformance. Performance fee funds charge total expenses, including the performance fee, that are substantially higher than those of other funds. Investors are more likely to punish poor performance in funds with performance fees than in other funds. Our results indicate that even when fees are less regulated, investors can generally be relied upon to make the right choices, but that there are a subset of funds where performance fees are employed to extract additional fees from investors.

An expansion in mortgage credit to subprime borrowers is widely believed to have been a principal driver of the 2002-2006 U.S. house price boom. By contrast, this paper documents a robust, negative correlation between the growth in the share of purchase mortgages to subprime borrowers and house price appreciation at the county-level during this time. Using two different instrumental variables approaches, we also establish causal evidence that house price appreciation lowered the share of purchase loans to subprime borrowers. Further analysis using micro-level credit bureau data shows that higher house price appreciation reduced the transition rate into first-time homeownership for subprime individuals. Finally, the paper documents that subprime borrowers did not play a significant role in the increased speculative activity and underwriting fraud that the literature has linked directly to the housing boom. Taken together, these results are more consistent with subprime borrowers being priced out of housing boom markets rather than inflating prices in those markets.

The rapid increase in U.S. house prices during the 2001–2006 period was accompanied by a historically rapid expansion of bank assets. We exploit cross-regional variation in local housing booms to study how housing demand shocks affected the growth of the banking sector. We estimate the effect of housing demand shocks that are orthogonal to observed non-housing demand shocks and credit supply shocks in each bank’s market area. We employ several instrumental variables that plausibly identify variation in local housing demand that is exogenous to local banks. We find that the housing boom had a large effect on bank asset growth—the cross-regional elasticity of bank growth with respect to housing demand shocks is around 0.6. The regional elasticity estimate suggests that housing demand shocks can potentially account for a large fraction of the growth of the banking sector during this period.

We assess the effects of board gender quota laws using a sample of banks from 39 countries. We document an increase in both stand-alone and systemic risk post-quota among banks that did not meet the quota pre-reform; the effect is stronger for banks in countries with a smaller pool of women in finance and low gender equality. We find that the propagation of poor governance practices by overlapping female directors and deterioration in the information environment post quota are likely channels driving the results. The evidence is consistent with some banks “gaming” the reform by strategically appointing insiders, which weakens the board's monitoring function. Our results have policy implications and suggest that supply-side factors are key determinants of the outcome of mandated quotas.

In an economy where banks take numeraire goods, so called money, as deposits, money allows depositors suffering preference shocks to withdraw from banks prematurely without liquidation of real investment. If real liquidity, defined as the real value of the monetary base, is low, the amount of payment liquidity, constrained by the velocity of money, limits the short-term price level of investment goods before banks can settle their long-term loan contracts. This leads to an attractive nominal long-term investment return and over-investment. Allowing for inside money, that is, bank deposits, to be used for payment can improve social welfare but cannot fully resolve the liquidity shortage problem as the short-term interest rate offered by banks is constrained by the threat of bank runs. In the presence of systemic liquidity shocks, the price-adjustment mechanism cannot take full effects with insufficient payment liquidity, which can lead to non-zero profits for banks. Exchanging investment goods for numeraire goods through international trade can improve social welfare.

We construct a new measure of deposit insurance generosity for many countries, empirically model the exogenous international influences on the adoption and generosity of deposit insurance and use a novel econometric method to explore the causal chain from the expansion of deposit insurance generosity to increased overall lending, increased lending to households, increased banking system leverage, and more severe and frequent banking crises. Greater deposit insurance generosity robustly produces greater overall lending relative to bank assets and more lending to households relative to both bank assets and GDP, and results in higher banking system leverage. Our estimates, however, are not conclusive regarding whether greater deposit insurance generosity resulted in greater total loans relative to GDP or in more frequent or severe banking crises.