Knowledge that Transforms

In most times and places, women on average marry older men. We propose a partial explanation for this difference and for why it is diminishing. In a society in which the economic roles of males are more varied than the roles of females, the relative desirability of females as marriage partners may become evident at an earlier age than is the case for males. We study an equilibrium model in which the males who regard their prospects as unusually good choose to wait until their economic success is revealed before choosing a bride. In equilibrium, the most desirable young females choose successful older males. Young males who believe that time will not treat them kindly will offer to marry at a young age. Although they are aware that young males available for marriage are no bargain, the less desirable young females will be offered no better option than the lottery presented by marrying a young male. We show the existence of equilibrium for models of this type and explore the properties of equilibrium.

This paper investigates the sensitivity of Solow residual based measures of technology shocks to labor-hoarding behavior. Using a structural model of labor hoarding and the identifying restriction that innovations to technology shocks are orthogonal to innovations in government consumption, the authors estimate the fraction of the variability of the Solow residual that is due to technology shocks. Their results support the view that a significant proportion of movements in the Solow residual are artifa cts of labor-hoarding behavior. Specifically, the authors estimate that the variance of innovations to technology is roughly 50 percent less than that implied by standard real business cycle models. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.

Characteristics of business cycles are quite different across developed countries. Real wages and working hours a re less sensitive to exogenous shocks in the United States than in Brit ain and Japan. Using a model with a microeconomic foundation, this paper provides an economic explanation of these differences. The cost of on-the-job training plays a crucial role. Workers seldom quit their jobs when the sunk training cost is high. In such economies, varianc es in employment and output become small and shocks tend to be absorbed by working hours and real wages. Thus, these characteristics do not necessarily indicate that the economy is more efficient. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.