A simple linear programming framework is used to simulate various forms of cooperation between representative farms of two villages in prewar China. The results suggest that even though the two farms individually were quite efficient revenue maximizers, significant mutual benefit would result from the formation of an elementary agricultural producers' cooperative. A move to an advanced cooperative in which dividend payments for land brought into the cooperative initially would be eliminated and income distributed solely according to labor contribution, however, would meet with strong resistance because a sizeable income loss would be involved for the farm with the larger initial land endowment.

I. Introduction, 697. — II. To cheat or not to cheat, 698. — III. The inhibited supply curve, 701. — IV. Conclusion, 702.

Journal Article Strategy in Point Voting: Comment Get access Dennis C. Mueller Dennis C. Mueller International Institute of Management, Berlin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 91, Issue 3, August 1977, Page 509, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885982 Published: 01 August 1977

I. The constitutional stage, 61. — II. The parliamentary stage, 64. — III. The allocation of decisions between the constitutional and parliamentary stages, 70. — IV. Summary of the theory, 77. — V. Implications for democratic reforms, 79.

Journal Article A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers: Reply Get access Dennis C. Mueller Dennis C. Mueller Cornell University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 84, Issue 4, November 1970, Pages 674–679, https://doi.org/10.2307/1880849 Published: 01 November 1970

I. The growth maximization hypothesis, 644. — II. The demand and supply of firms when managers maximize stockholder welfare, 648. — III. The demand and supply of firms when managers and stockholders have different expectations, 653. — IV. Differences in discount rates as a cause of mergers, 654. — V. Growth maximization in light of recent merger history, 657.

I. A general formulation of the model, 59. — II. The choice of dependent variables, 61. — III. The capital investment equation, 64. — IV. The R & D equation, 71. — V. The advertising equation, 74. — VI. The dividends equation, 75. — VII. An appraisal of the model, 77. — VIII. Policy implications of the results, 81. — IX. Conclusion, 84. — Appendix, 84.

Introduction, 181. — I. Autonomous Investment, 181. — II. The Domar Equation, 184. — III. The Kalecki Effect, 188.

Journal Article Some Notes on Mr. Keynes' General Theory of Employment Get access Dennis H. Robertson Dennis H. Robertson Trinity College, Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 51, Issue 1, November 1936, Pages 168–191, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882506 Published: 01 November 1936

I. Introduction, 1.—II. Context of the model, 3.—III. Consumer specifications and market equilibrium in the case of fixed breakdown probabilities, 5.—IV. Breakdown probabilities set by profit considerations, 11.—V. Conclusion, 19.—Appendix, 20.