Journal Article The Marginalist Principle in a Discrete Production Model Under Uncertain Demand: Comment Get access T. M. Whitin T. M. Whitin Wesleyan University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 88, Issue 1, February 1974, Pages 139–140, https://doi.org/10.2307/1881801 Published: 01 February 1974

I. Introduction, 520. — II. A simple model, 522. — III. An examination of Graham's principal conclusions, 526. — IV. Relaxation of the assumptions, 537. — V. Relation to linear programming, 540. — Mathematical Appendix, 542.

I. Current emphasis on inventory control, 502. — II. The calculation of economic purchase quantities and reorder points, 503. — III. The interaction of economical purchase quantities and reorder point quantities, 508. — IV. Analysis of inventory control problems for style goods, 513. — V. The relationship between inventory control analysis, businessmen's behavior, and economic theory, 517.

I. Introduction, 603. — II. Variations in factor inputs that are less than proportionate to changes in output, 604. — III. The influence of risk on the scale of operations, 607. — IV. More fundamental difficulties with constant factor proportions, 608. — V. The management factor and economies of scale, 611. — VI. Conclusion, 612.

In the context of an overlapping-generations model, we show that Uquidity constraints on households (i) raise the saving rate, (ii) strengthen the effect of growth on saving, (iii) increase the growth rate if productivity growth is endogenous, and (iv) may increase welfare. The first three positions are supported by cross-country regressions of saving and growth rates on indicators of liquidity contraints on households. The results suggest that financial deregulation in the 1980s has contributed to the decline in national saving and growth rates in the OECD countries.

Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also many transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. Exchanges are also made in which a donor-patient pair makes a donation to someone waiting for a cadaver kidney, in return for the patient in the pair receiving high priority for a compatible cadaver kidney when one becomes available. There are stringent legal/ethical constraints on how exchanges can be conducted. We explore how larger scale exchanges of these kinds can be arranged efficiently and incentive compatibly, within existing constraints. The problem resembles some of the “housing” problems studied in the mechanism design literature for indivisible goods, with the novel feature that while live donor kidneys can be assigned simultaneously, cadaver kidneys cannot. In addition to studying the theoretical properties of the proposed kidney exchange, we present simulation results suggesting that the welfare gains from larger scale exchange would be substantial, both in increased number of feasible live donation transplants, and in improved match quality of transplanted kidneys.

There has been a dramatic change in the division of responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods and services in recent years with an increasing trend toward contracting out to the private sector and “public-private partnerships.” This paper analyzes how ownership matters in public good provision. We show that if contracts are incomplete then the ownership of a public good should lie with a party that values the benefits generated by it relatively more. This is true regardless of whether this party is also the key investor, or other aspects of the technology.

We investigate the channels through which partisan influence from a Presidential administration could affect monetary policy-making. Influence could be a result of direct Presidential pressure exerted on members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), or it could be a result of partisan considerations in Presidential appointments to the Board of Governors. To investigate these two channels of influence, we devise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary policy reaction functions that can vary across individual members of the FOMC. Our results suggest that the appointments process is the primary mechanism by which partisan differences in monetary policies arise.

Journal Article Interfirm Profitability Differences: Comment Get access R. E. Caves, R. E. Caves Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar B. T. Gale, B. T. Gale University of Massachusetts Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar M. E. Porter M. E. Porter Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 91, Issue 4, November 1977, Pages 667–675, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885889 Published: 01 November 1977