We find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives, and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented. We study supervisory decisions of U.S. banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals. Comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank, we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher, downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors. State regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently. Under federal regulators, banks report worse asset quality, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower return on assets. Leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes, such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds. The discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and, to some extent, differences in regulatory resources. We find no support for regulator self-interest, which includes “revolving doors” as a reason for leniency of state regulators

We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems, and that socialist, French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries. However, the effects of legal origins are larger, and explain more of the variation in regulations, than those of politics. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are most naturally consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems

We document that, in a cross section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with measures of trust. In a simple model explaining this correlation, distrust creates public demand for regulation, whereas regulation in turn discourages formation of trust, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low-trust countries want more government intervention even though they know the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on trust and beliefs about the role of government, as well as on changes in beliefs during the transition from socialism

Introduction, 604. — Circumstances under which motor-carrier regulation has developed, 606. — Characteristics which explain the regulation of railroads and other utilities largely absent, 608. — Restriction of entrance must be distinguished from other phases of regulation, 613. — Such restriction only partially explained by the nature of the industry, 615. — Protection of railway interests the dominant consideration, 620. — Delicate problems involved in granting of certificates of convenience and necessity, 625. — Difficulties and dangers of regulation exemplified by motor freight regulation, 632. — The theory of special highway use improperly reflected in motor-carrier regulation and taxation, 639. — Conclusion, 646

The industry: definition, 194; characteristics, 195; structure, 196; economies of scale, 197. — Price regulation from World War I to the N.R.A.: newsprint, 198; book paper, 200; other branches, 201. — Price regulation during the N.R.A.: the newsprint code, 203; the general paper code, 204. — Price regulation after the N.R.A.: prewar developments, 206; war-time control, 210. — Summary, 211. — Some pertinent questions: restriction of price competition, 212; effects of price competition, 215; public policy, 216

X-Efficiency, 236. — Incentive pricing, 243. — Incentive pricing applied to regulated utilities, 244. — Calibration, 247. — The regulatory lag, 251. — Conclusion

We present a model in which setting up and running a regulatory institution takes a fixed cost. As a consequence, the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market. We test three implications of this model. First, jurisdictions with larger populations affected by a given regulation are more likely to have it. Second, jurisdictions with lower incremental fixed costs of introducing and administering new regulations should regulate more. This implies that regulation spreads from higher to lower population jurisdictions, and that jurisdictions that build up transferable regulatory capabilities should regulate more intensely. Consistent with the model, we find that higher population U. S. states have more pages of legislation and adopt particular laws earlier in their history than do smaller states. We also find that the regulation of entry, the regulation of labor, and the military draft are more extensive in countries with larger populations, as well as in civil law countries, where we argue that the incremental fixed costs are lower

In choosing a two-part tariff, a monopoly subject to rate-of-return regulation will rely more on demand elasticities and less on marginal costs than would a welfare-maximizing firm. The rate-of-return regulated firm also will reduce its access fee or its marginal usage fee more, depending on whether adding consumers or increasing output requires marginally the most capital. In the typical case these effects will favor declining-block rate structures, which helps to explain their widespread use by rate-of-return regulated firms

This paper examines the problem of a regulated utility that sells output according to a nonlinear price schedule. Three results are obtained. First, rate-of-return regulation lowers the price schedule charged by the firm along its entire length. Second, some units of output will always be sold at a marginal price below true marginal cost. Third, a move from linear to nonlinear prices at a given fair rate-of-return can lead to an unambiguous increase in welfare

I. Introduction, 197. — II. Substitutability: theoretical arguments, 198. — III. Empirical tests: general approach, 200. — IV. Conclusions regarding regulations and monetary policy, 213. — Appendix, 213