Knowledge that Transforms

In the investment theory, firms with high expected investment growth earn higher expected returns than firms with low expected investment growth, holding investment and expected profitability constant. Building on cross-sectional growth forecasts with Tobin’s q, operating cash flows, and change in return on equity as predictors, an expected growth factor earns an average premium of 0.84% per month (t = 10.27) in the 1967–2018 sample. The q5 model, which augments the Hou–Xue–Zhang (2015, Rev. Finan. Stud., 28, 650–705) q-factor model with the expected growth factor, shows strong explanatory power in the cross-section and outperforms the Fama–French (2018, J. Finan. Econom., 128, 234–252) six-factor model.

This article examines the effect of regulatory constraints on fund performance and risk by comparing conventional and UCITS hedge funds. Using a matching estimator approach, we estimate the indirect cost of UCITS regulation to be between 1.06% and 4.05% per annum in terms of risk-adjusted returns. These performance differences are likely to stem from UCITS constraints such as those governing eligible assets, diversification, and short selling, and cannot be explained by differences in redemption terms or level of leverage. We confirm that our performance results are not driven by management company characteristics, fund manager characteristics, or unobserved confounder bias.

Abstract We study local loan conditions when banks close branches. In places where branch closures do not take place, firms that purposely switch banks receive a sixty-three basis points (bps) discount. However, after the closure of nearby branches of their credit-granting banks, firms that locally and hurriedly transfer to other banks receive no such discount. Yet, the loan default rate for the latter (more expensive) transfer loans is on average a full percentage point lower than that for the former (cheaper) switching loans. This suggests that transfer firms are of “better” quality than switching firms. In sum, even if local markets remain competitive, when banks close branches, firms lose.

Abstract We show that returns to value strategies in individual equities, industries, commodities, currencies, global government bonds, and global stock indexes are predictable in the time series by their respective value spreads. In all these asset classes, expected value returns vary by at least as much as their unconditional level. A single common component of the value spreads captures about two-thirds of value return predictability and the remainder is asset class specific. We argue that common variation in value premia is consistent with rationally time-varying expected returns, because (i) common value is closely associated with standard proxies for risk premia, such as the dividend yield, intermediary leverage, and illiquidity, and (ii) value premia are globally high in bad times.

Abstract Firms in the US economy are closely interconnected in a production network and are subject to shocks that propagate within the network. This study examines the liquidity management of firms centrally connected in the network. I show that, while central firms are more exposed to aggregate swings, they maintain higher cash holdings to protect themselves and connected firms against such exposure. Central firms’ cash holding motives are alleviated by firm diversification but are aggravated by industry competition. Such motives are not explained by alternative determinants of cash policies. My findings suggest that systematically important firms proactively dampen the propagation of shocks in the production network.

Abstract This paper investigates the effect of access to finance on job growth in over 780,000 firms across twenty-two developing countries. Using the introduction of credit bureaus as an exogenous shock to the supply of credit, the paper finds that increased access to finance results in higher employment growth, especially among micro, small, and medium enterprises. The results are robust to using firm-fixed effects, industry measures of external finance dependence, and propensity score matching. Our findings have implications for policy interventions targeted to produce job growth.

Abstract We test whether high-frequency net-debt issuers (HFIs)—public industrial companies with relatively low issuance costs and high debt-financing benefits—manage leverage toward long-run targets. Our answer is they do not: (1) the leverage–profitability correlation is negative even in quarters with leverage rebalancing; (2) the speed-of-adjustment to target leverage deviations is no higher for HFIs than for low-frequency net-debt issuers; and (3) under-leveraged HFIs do not speed up rebalancing activity in significant investment periods. Thus, even in the subset of firms most likely to follow dynamic trade-off theory, the theory does not appear to hold.

Abstract We introduce an arbitrage-free term structure model of nominal and real yields that accounts for liquidity risk in Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS). The novel feature of our model is to identify liquidity risk from individual TIPS prices by accounting for the tendency that TIPS, like most fixed-income securities, go into buy-and-hold investors’ portfolios as time passes. We find a sizable and countercyclical TIPS liquidity premium, which helps our model to match TIPS prices. Accounting for liquidity risk also improves the model’s ability to forecast inflation and match surveys of inflation expectations.

Abstract This article studies how early-stage entrepreneurs respond to negative feedback about the quality of their ventures. We use data from new venture competitions, some of which privately inform founders of their relative rank. The empirical strategy compares lower and higher ranked losers across competitions in which they did and did not observe their standing. Receiving negative feedback increases average venture abandonment by 13%. Differences in responsiveness—for example, in venture risk, venture maturity, and signal precision—are consistent with particular theories about entrepreneurship, including the importance of experimentation.

Abstract Exploiting China’s anti-corruption campaign, we show that following a decrease in corruption, firm performance improves. Small and young firms benefit more. We identify the channels through which corruption hampers firm performance. Following the anti-corruption campaign, the allocation of capital and labor becomes more efficient. Firms operating in ex ante more corrupt environments experience larger productivity gains, higher growth of sales, and lower cost of debt than other firms. Taken together, our results suggest that corruption is an inefficient equilibrium for an economy because it creates negative externalities.