Knowledge that Transforms

Most models of financial structure embody an assumption about financial distress that causes debt to be costly to the issuing firm. This approach has been criticized on the grounds that the assumed costs could be avoided by a costless financial reorganization. In this article we show that despite the possibility of costless reorganization, it may be rational for firms to incur significant costs in the resolution of financial distress. The main assumptions that give rise to our results are the existence of asymmetric courts to impose a reorganization on the claimants of a firm. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Earnings and dividend announcements on Fridays are much more likely to contain reports of declines and to be associated with negative abnormal returns than those on other weekdays. While Friday reports elicit negative average returns for firms in all size classes, announcements by smaller firms have more negative returns associated with them on the following trading day, suggesting that they are more likely to release reports after close of trading or that prices adjust more slowly to the information in these reports. Nevertheless, a comparison of the average returns by weekday, with and without the Friday announcements, leads us to conclude that these announcements explain a surprisingly small proportion (3.4 percent) of the weekend effect.

When management has private information it has an incentive to finance investment by issuing a security that is overpriced in the market. The market's valuation of the issued security may lead management either to forego profitable investments or to invest suboptimally. With investment fixed, there exist fully revealing signaling equilibria in which the covenants of the issued claim serve as signals. A straight bond issue cannot provide the signals but a convertible bond issue can. With investment endogenous, fully revealing equilibria exist in which the par value of a straight bond issue and the announced level of investment jointly serve as signals and investment is optimal. The article also investigates the role of a stock repurchase in these equilibria.

We develop a numerical approximation method for valuing multivariate contingent claims. The approach is based on an n-dimensional extension of the lattice binomial method. Closed-form solutions for the jump probabilities and the jump amplitudes are obtained. The accuracy of the method is illustrated in the case of European options when there are three underlying assets.

Wben several investors with different risk aversions trade competitively in a capital market, the allocation of wealth fluctuates randomly among them and acts as a state variable against which each market participant will want to hedge. This hedging motive complicates the investors ' portfolio choice and the equilibrium in the capital market. This article features two investors, with the same degree of impatience, one of them being logarithmic and the other having an isoelastic utility function. They face one risky constant-return-to-scale stationary production opportunity and they can borrow and lend to and from each other. The behaviors of the allocation of wealth and of the aggregate capital stock are characterized, along with the behavior of the rate of interest, the security market line, and the portfolio boldings. The two-investor equilibrium problem is as basic to financial economics as is the two-body problem to mechanics. Yet, to my knowledge, no complete description of the dynamic interaction between two investors

This article analyzes the volume of trade in a multiperiod noisy rational expectations model. When traders receive private signals at the first trading date and are allowed a second round of trade, two type of equilibria exist. In the first, traders do not learn about the average private signal from the second round of trade, and all trade takes place at the first date. In the second, traders do learn from the second round, and trade thus takes places at both the first and second dates. The article characterizes volume when a public signal is disclosed at the second date.

Technical analysis, or the use of past prices to infer private information, has value in a model in which prices are not fully revealing and traders have rational conjectures about the relation between prices and signals. A two-period dynamic model of equilibrium is used to demonstrate that rational investors use historical prices in forming their demands and to illustrate the sensitivity of the value of technical analysis to changes in the values of the exogenous parameters.

In this article we construct a model in which a consumer's utility depends on the consumption history. We describe a general equilibrium framework similar to Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a). A simple example is then solved in closed form in this general equilibrium setting to rationalize the observed stickiness of the consumption series relative to the fluctuations in stock market wealth. The sample paths of consumption generated from this model imply lower variability in consumption growth rates compared to those generated by models with separable utility functions. We then present partial equilibrium model similar to Merton (1969, 1971) and extend Merton's results on optimal consumption and portfolio rules to accommodate nonseparability in preferences. Asset pricing implications of our framework are briefly explored.

This article presents a model that provides insights about various measures of portfolio performance. The model explores several criticisms of these measures. These include the problem of identifying an appropriate benchmark portfolio, the possibility of overestimating risk because of market-timing ability, and the failure of informed investors to earn positive risk-adjusted returns because of increasing risk aversion. The article argues that these need not be serious impediments to performance evaluation.

[We develop a model in which stock repurchases serve as a defense against takeovers by signaling the manager's private information about the value of the firm. The manager repurchases shares to block a takeover only if the cost of doing so is not too high. Since the cost is inversely related to the value of the firm under his management, a repurchase signals that the value of the stock is high, blocking a takeover. While a repurchase increases the expected value of the stock, it also makes the stock riskier. The model also implies that there are too few takeovers for efficiency.]