Knowledge that Transforms

We analyze the role of knowhow acquisition in the formation and duration of joint ventures. Two parties become partners in a joint venture to benefit from each other’s knowhow. Joint operations provide each party with the opportunity to acquire part of its partner’s knowhow. A party’s increased knowhow provides the impetus for the dissolution of the joint venture. We characterize the conditions under which dissolution takes place, identify the party that buys out its partner, determine the time to dissolution, establish its comparative statics, and examine the implications of knowledge acquisition for the desirability of joint venture formation. (JEL code: G34)

We derive an asymptotic expansion formula for option implied volatility under a two-factor jump-diffusion stochastic volatility model when time-to-maturity is small. We further propose a simple calibration procedure of an arbitrary parametric model to short-term near-the-money implied volatilities. An important advantage of our approximation is that it is free of the unobserved spot volatility. Therefore, the model can be calibrated on option data pooled across different calendar dates to extract information from the dynamics of the implied volatility smile. An example of calibration to a sample of S&P 500 option prices is provided.

This article investigates a fund manager's risk-taking incentives induced by an increasing and convex relationship of fund flows to relative performance. In a dynamic portfolio choice framework, we show that the ensuing convexities in the manager's objective give rise to a finite risk-shifting range over which she gambles to finish ahead of her benchmark. Such gambling entails either an increase or a decrease in the volatility of the manager's portfolio, depending on her risk tolerance. In the latter case, the manager reduces her holdings of the risky asset despite its positive risk premium. Our empirical analysis lends support to the novel predictions of the model.

Firms sometimes commit fraud by altering publicly reported information to be more favorable, and investors can monitor firms to obtain more accurate information. We study equilibrium fraud and monitoring decisions. Fraud is most likely to occur in relatively good times, and the link between fraud and good times becomes stronger as monitoring costs decrease. Nevertheless, improving business conditions may sometimes diminish fraud. We provide an explanation for why fraud peaks towards the end of a boom and is then revealed in the ensuing bust. We also show that fraud can increase if firms make more information available to the public. (JEL E320, G300, G380) Booms and busts are a common feature of market economies. Almost as common is the belief that a boom encourages and conceals financial fraud and misrepresentation by firms, which are then revealed by the ensuing bust. Examples in the last century include the 1920s [Galbraith (1955)], the ‘‘go-go’ ’ market of the 1960s and early 1970s [Labaton (2002), Schilit (2002)], and the use of junk bonds and LBOs in the 1980s [Kaplan and

The Tokyo Grain Exchange (TGE)’s itayose mechanism provides the opportunity to analyze functioning Walrasian tâtonnement auctions (WTA). In 15,677 auctions conducted over 1997–1998 for corn and redbean futures contracts, price formation is unexpectedly similar to that observed in continuous double auctions. Provisional prices and pledges are informative. In contrast to behavior observed in experiments, few pledges are deceptive, because the traders participate repeatedly and because the auctioneer has flexibility when changing the provisional price and ending the auction. Both the risk of the auction ending and the more equitable dispersion of information increase depth and the speed at which information is embodied in price.

I show that firms may optimally sell blocks of their own equity to other firms in anticipation of future corporate control activity. In the model, a target and one potential acquirer, who may also be an alliance partner, can negotiate before synergy values are learned. I find that equity implements an optimal mechanism, allowing the partners to extract surplus from outside bidders who may arrive later. The stake is limited by the outsiders' willingness to investigate. The results imply that corporate control may motivate an equity sale even when no takeover activity is apparent at the time or occurs ex post.

It is well known that risk increases the value of options. This article makes that precise in a new way. The conventional theorem says that the value of an option does not fall if the underlying asset becomes riskier in the conventional sense of the mean-preserving spread. This article uses two new definitions of “riskier” to show that the value of an option strictly increases (i) if the underlying asset becomes “pointwise riskier,” and (ii) only if the underlying asset becomes “extremum riskier.”

This article proposes a new explanation for the large cross-sectional variation in the excess values of diversified firms. The model applies the idea of shareholders’ limited liability affecting firms ’ output market strategies to the analysis of financial and operating choices of conglomerates. The inability of conglomerates to commit to unconstrained optimal operating strategies, following from the lack of flexibility in choosing their divisions ’ capital structures, reduces their value. Thus, the model highlights a new type of inefficiency of the conglomerate organizational structure, which is suboptimal financing. The predictions of the model are generally supported by the data. (JEL G32, G34, L13) The valuation of diversified firms (conglomerates) that operate divisions in multiple industries has attracted significant attention in recent years. Early evidence suggests that conglomerates are discounted, on average, relative to their single-division rivals (e.g., Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Lins and Servaes (1999), and Klein (2001)). More recent studies show that carefully controlling for the endogeneity of the decision

We provide evidence that commercial banks extend their reputation in underwriting syndicated loans and private placements (private debt) to their bond-underwriting activities. In the absence of bond market reputation, private-debt-market reputation enables commercial banks to win underwriting mandates from their loan clients. Furthermore, it allows them to credibly commit to investors against opportunistically using lending information and thereby deliver superior certification benefits in the form of higher issue prices relative to investment-bank underwriters. This pricing benefit is not offset by higher underwriting fees and thus results in lower total issuance costs for borrowers.