We develop an empirical proxy for companies’ differential communication to local and foreign investors using translation differences in public disclosure. We validate our proxy using a field experiment and then use this proxy to document that differential communication is associated with increases in information asymmetry between local and foreign investors. It is also linked to decreases in the relative information quality of foreign analysts, even when foreign demand for information is high and communication costs are low. These and a variety of supporting tests, including those using an alternative artificial intelligence (AI)-based measure of translation differences, suggest that firms engage in differential communication because of a preference for local investors and when responding to incentives to maximize stock price. This study highlights the role of differential communication as one driver of local information advantage in our setting. Data Availability: Most data are available from publicly available sources, as described in the paper. The field experiment data are available upon request

Why do seemingly similar firms show such different productivity? We argue that unresolved measurement problems, i.e., the persistent incongruity between economic transactions and their accounting representation, affect resource allocation. Our metric quantifies technical accounting terminology in firm disclosures to capture these unresolved measurement problems, UMPs, using over 90,000 10-Ks. A one standard deviation increase in UMP is associated with lower capital investment (6 percent), R&D (5 percent), and hiring growth (30 percent). We also find a reduction in total factor productivity (5 percent) and Tobin’s q (4 percent). Further, CEO compensation sensitivity to accounting performance decreases with UMP, whereas stock-based sensitivity remains unaffected. Our inferences continue to hold when we use a Bartik instrument, which exploits differential exposure to GAAP changes to isolate accounting-driven variation from the firm’s underlying economics. The results suggest unresolved measurement problems are a significant friction in resource allocation. Data Availability: The UMP dataset is available upon request. Please contact the first author.

We examine whether and how a widely established finding—employees respond negatively to managerial monitoring—generalizes to different performance-evaluation systems. We predict that relative performance evaluations (RPEs), a common evaluation feature in multiagent settings, attenuate employees’ negative responses to managerial monitoring. The results of our experiment support our theory. Consistent with prior literature, we find that without RPE, employees respond significantly more negatively to managerial monitoring compared to no monitoring. However, we find that the effect of managerial monitoring on employee responses is moderated in the presence of RPE—employees respond similarly regardless of whether their manager implements a monitoring control. We provide robust analyses to support our theory-derived mechanisms, demonstrating that our results are driven by employees’ fairness perceptions of managers’ monitoring decisions. Collectively, this study aids in the understanding of how and under what circumstances managerial monitoring may be more or less beneficial. Data Availability: Available upon request.

We examine the implications of GAAP earnings forecast quality for accounting research. Using a tax law change with an estimable and material GAAP earnings impact, we find that analysts’ GAAP forecasts generally fail to incorporate this impact, whereas investors respond promptly, suggesting that GAAP forecasts omit earnings information deemed relevant by investors and are of low quality. Analyzing quarterly GAAP forecasts from 2004–2019 and classifying GAAP forecasts that equal their street counterparts when GAAP and street actuals differ as low quality, we again find widespread low GAAP forecast quality. Low quality GAAP forecasts affect research inferences: they dampen GAAP earnings response coefficient (ERC) estimates, reduce the explanatory power of GAAP surprises for returns, affect inferences regarding market rewards for meeting-or-beating via exclusions, and understate the extent that GAAP forecasts incorporate exclusion components. We propose two strategies to mitigate the adverse effects of low quality GAAP forecasts on research inferences. Data Availability: Data are from publicly available sources as identified within the manuscript.

Although rapidly evolving, quality control (QC) systems are a poorly understood determinant of audit quality. We interview 27 QC system leaders to understand how they navigate the challenges they face in changing QC systems. We find that many challenges—including obtaining buy-in, evaluating costs and benefits, and advancing proactive over reactive changes—are caused by conflicting demands arising internally. Consistent with institutional theory, our data reveal that leaders respond to conflicting demands by seeking partial conformity (e.g., negotiating among stakeholders) or by altering the framing of the demands (e.g., using scientific logic to legitimize a QC change). Interviews of eight QC system users complement and corroborate our main results and suggest opportunities for future research. Our study sheds light on how firms update QC systems and informs practitioners, regulators, and academics of the forces that shape the evolution of QC systems. Data Availability: Our data are not publicly available to preserve participant anonymity.

This paper presents a model in which investors price risk and a firm makes an investment to reduce its cash flow risk. Subsequently, the firm may or may not privately receive information about the future cash flow, whose disclosure is under its discretion. We show that the equilibrium cash flow precision increases with investor risk aversion, but decreases with the likelihood that the firm has private information and the quality of that information. In addition, the equilibrium probability of disclosure increases when the firm is more likely to have higher-quality private information, but it may increase or decrease when investor risk aversion increases. Using these comparative statics, we rationalize mixed empirical findings on the relation between risk and disclosure as equilibrium outcomes. The model is extended to a setting where the firm also makes an investment to increase the mean of its future cash flow

This paper examines the effect of financial regulation on nonfinancial violations. Using differences in compliance requirements with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) Section 404, we find that adoption of Section 404 increased firms’ propensity for nonfinancial violations. This effect is stronger for firms with greater external scrutiny toward their financial reporting, greater challenges in monitoring their operations, and limited resources. These results, together with an examination of changes in audit fees, conference call transcripts, and 10-K disclosures, suggest that the effects primarily stem from a shift in attention and resources toward SOX 404. Further, the effects are concentrated in employee-related violations and persist for approximately two years. Overall, our results suggest that financial reporting regulation can result in unintended consequences harming stakeholders, such as employees

This paper discusses my experiences as a nontenure track faculty member who now serves as an Associate Dean. It is based on my Presidential Scholar Lecture at the 2024 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting. In 2012, the Pathways Commission outlined the need and a path for more practitioners to join academia (Behn et al. 2012), and my academic career advanced partly due to that initiative. Earning a Doctor of Business Administration (D.B.A.) degree from University of Florida allowed me to support my school as a scholarly academic and pursue research that enhances my teaching and provided me with a path to administration as a nontenure track faculty member

Although audit regulators worldwide concur that the rigor of audit firms’ internal engagement quality reviews (EQRs) is paramount to an audit firm’s audit quality, they are concerned that relationships between audit engagement partner (AEP) and engagement review partner (ERP) working in the same firm can undermine these reviews. We utilize confidential proprietary ERP and audit adjustment data to investigate how school alma mater ties between AEPs and ERPs affect audit adjustments in China. Our results reveal that audit adjustments are significantly lower when an AEP and ERP share school ties. This effect is more pronounced when the ERP is less competent than and lacks authority over the AEP, when the ERP and AEP perform mutual reviews or previously coaudited a client, and when the AEP’s work is flawed. Finally, semistructured partner interviews corroborate our empirical findings and strengthen our practical and policy implications. Data Availability: These proprietary data were provided to us with the understanding that it would be used only for independent academic research. Our research team is obligated under nondisclosure and confidentiality conditions to not disclose or share the confidential information which includes all of the data received from the data providers of the Chinese government and not to report information in any article or presentation that would inadvertently reveal (including any potential link) the identity of the partners, firms, their characteristics, and the audit adjustment data. No other restrictions were imposed by the data providers regarding the use of the data purely for academic research purposes and in communicating the research findings. Other data not subject to this confidentiality nondisclosure are available from sources identified in the text

This paper examines how incumbent firms adjust their disclosure behavior in response to heightened labor market competition. Using announcements of large employer entries into local labor markets, I find that incumbent firms located in the affected counties increase the disclosure of positive, forward-looking information. This response is concentrated among incumbent firms that compete more directly with entrant firms for similar workers and is strongest in local labor markets where employee retention pressures are likely to be more severe. Additional analyses show that the response extends to qualitative disclosure, particularly job-related and reputation-enhancing press releases, is associated with more favorable subsequent employment outcomes, and is unlikely to be explained by alternative motives related to productivity spillovers, supply-chain linkages, product market competition, or capital market considerations. Overall, the evidence supports the view that firms use public disclosure to shape employee perceptions and mitigate turnover risk when competition for talent intensifies. Data Availability: Data are available from the public and commercial sources cited in the paper