We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for communication of private, unverifiable managerial information to be valuable for stewardship purposes. First, the hard, verifiable information must be able to confirm to some extent the truthfulness of the manager's soft, unverifiable report. Second, neither the hard, verifiable information nor the soft, unverifiable managerial report should be too informative for providing effort incentives because that makes it harder to motivate truthful reports from the manager. In particular, this conflict can be sufficiently severe that eliciting reports from the manager has no value.

We derive sufficient conditions for ranking performance evaluation systems in multi-task agency models (using both optimal and linear contracts) in terms of a second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) condition on the likelihood ratios. The SSD condition can be replaced by a variance-covariance matrix of likelihood ratios (VCM) condition when the utility function is square-root, the performance measures are normally distributed, and for LEN models. We identify existing results derived under the LEN assumptions that rely on the VCM condition and, thus, also hold for optimal contracts.