Journal Article Spatial Competition and Spatial Price Discrimination Get access George Norman George Norman University of Reading Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 1, January 1981, Pages 97–111, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297123 Published: 01 January 1981 Article history Received: 01 October 1979 Accepted: 01 May 1980 Published: 01 January 1981

This paper generalizes analysis of spatial pricing policies to cases in which oligopolists produce differentiated products. It is shown that spatial price discrimination through freight absorption is affected by the number of competitive firms, the extent to which their products are substitutes, and by the locations such firms adopt in the market. It is further shown, however, that spatial price discrimination may be the consequence of collusive agreements, or of attempts to anticipate competitors' actions. The simple (spaceless) foundations of current policies on spatial pricing need to be reexamined, but this reexamination must take into account interconnections between producers, the extent to which their products are differentiated, and their locations.

When to Exit a Product: Evidence from the U. S. Motion-Picture Exhibition Market by Darlene C. Chisholm and George Norman. Published in volume 96, issue 2, pages 57-61 of American Economic Review, May 2006