Because of limited liability, insolvent banks have an incentive to continue lending to insolvent borrowers, in order to hide losses and gamble for resurrection, even though this is socially inefficient. We suggest a scheme that regulators could use to solve this problem. The scheme would induce banks to reveal their bad loans, which can then be dealt with. Bank participation in the scheme would be voluntary. Even though banks have private information on the quantity of bad loans on their balance sheets, the scheme avoids creating windfall gains for bank equity holders. In addition, some losses can be imposed on debt holders.

In this paper we study the determinants of banks’ decisions to adopt a transactional website for their customers. Using a panel of commercial banks in the United States for the period 2003–2006, we show that although bank-specific characteristics are important determinants of banks’ adoption decisions, competition also plays a prominent role. The extent of competition is related to the geographic overlap of banks in different markets and their relative market share in terms of deposits. In particular, banks adopt online banking services earlier in markets where their competitors have already adopted this technology. This paper is one of the first to construct local banking markets using the geographic market definitions delimited by the CASSIDI® Database compiled at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.