I develop a framework for assessing economic warfare, which describes efforts to undermine adversaries' sources of income. The ability to target adversarial market participants is a primary determinant of the success of such efforts, as is the elasticity of demand in the relevant market. An application of the framework to US efforts to suppress the Afghan opium trade yields pessimistic results. Inelastic demand and poorly targeted enforcement have led these efforts to increase the drug trade resources flowing toward the Taliban.

We show that the demand shocks associated with the U.S. Civil War and World War I led to substantial increases in prosthetic device patenting (relative to patenting in other medical and mechanical technology classes). Through analyses of patent texts, we find that the Civil War led inventors to focus on production process improvements, while World War I did not. Further, we find that inventors emphasized dimensions of product quality that aligned with differences in buyers’ preferences across wars. Alongside evidence from the historical record, these findings imply that procurement environments can significantly shape the scientific problems with which inventors engage.

We explore whether minimum wage increases result in substitution from lower-skilled to slightly higher-skilled labor. Using 2011–16 American Community Survey (ACS) data, we show that workers employed in low-wage occupations are older and more likely to have a high school diploma following recent statutory minimum wage increases. To better understand the role of firms, we examine the Burning Glass vacancy data. We find increases in a high school diploma requirement following minimum wage hikes, consistent with our ACS evidence on stocks of employed workers. We see substantial adjustments to requirements both within and across firms.