This paper provides a dynamic analysis of ex post public disclosure in a privately informed stock market economy. Investors cannot observe the underlying laws of motion of the economy, and this precludes them from immediately forming rational expectations. Instead, expectations are formed adaptively, and two positive roles are identified for public disclosure. First, it enables investors to recursively modify their forecast rules each period using their most recent forecast errors. Second, public disclosure via its recursive modification role imposes a common influence over the time path of each investor's expectations, and this can drive the economy as a whole towards attaining a noisy rational expectations equilibrium. Résumé. L'auteur propose une analyse dynamique de la publication ex post dans un marché boursier disposant d'informations privilégiées. Les investisseurs ne peuvent observer les lois sous‐jacentes aux mouvements de l'économie, et il leur est done impossible de formuler immédiatement leurs prévisions rationnelles. Les prévisions s'élaborent plutoCt de façon adaptative, et deux rôles positifs sont attribués à la publication. Premièrement, elle permet aux investisseurs de procéder à l'ajustement récursif de leurs règles prévisionnelles pour chaque période, à partir de leur erreur prévisionnelle la plus récente. Deuxièmement, la publication, grâce à son rôle d'ajustement récursif, exerce une influence uniforme sur l'évolution temporelle des prévisions de chaque investisseur, ce qui peut mener l'économie dans son ensemble vers un équilibre instable de prévisions rationnelles.

We study the performance of the rational expectations hypothesis in multiperiod experimental markets with multiple assets. We find that the markets are generally inefficient from the point of view of full information aggregation. However, arbitrage relationships hold, and it is not possible to detect the informational inefficiency by using some standard tests of market efficiency. These findings suggest that the lack of arbitrage opportunities and the failure of common tests to reject inefficiency are not sufficient to conclude that a market is informationally efficient.

Analyst forecasts, Forecasting, Forecast horizons, Forecast consistency

In an experimental setting when outcomes are stochastically related to actions, predictions of equilibrium behavior depend not only on the participants' preference orderings of outcomes, but also on their orderings of lotteries on outcomes as well. We introduce and test a reward structure that can be utilized in any experimental setting to allow the experimenter to decree beforehand the subjects' preferences for lotteries on experimental outcomes. We show analytically that the proposed reward structure can induce subjects to behave as if they have the decreed preference function defined on experimental outcomes. Empirical tests using two different choice settings provide evidence to support this ability to control preferences.

This paper develops a framework to assess the ability of electric utilities to sustain the forced impairment of carbon emitting power plants and applies it to the European market. We present a new method to measure asset impairment, for both the company and the industry, based on a database of power plants. We develop a novel framework to analyse a utility's ability to transition by investing in green technology assets through the impact on its credit rating metrics. Finally, we apply our framework to European utilities under scenarios set out by the European Commission to limit global warming by imposing net zero carbon emissions constraints on companies. We conclude that most European utilities have the financial capacity to meet the requirements of net zero carbon emissions under the scenarios with timely action. However, a delay of as little as five years could cause serious financial problems across the sector.