This study is the first in the economics literature to explore the labor market consequences of sexual violence toward women. Using data from the Add Health, we find that sexual violence against women is associated with a 6.6 percent lower probability of labor force participation and 5.1 percent lower average wages. These estimates are robust to controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the school- and family-levels, as well as detailed controls for personality, personal discount rates, and risk preferences. We find that the adverse labor market effects of sexual violence are partially explained by its adverse psychological and physical consequences.

Abstract This study re-examines Dube (2019), which finds large and statistically significant poverty-reducing effects of the minimum wage. We show that his estimated elasticities are fragile and sensitive to (1) time period under study, (2) choice of macroeconomic controls, (3) limiting counterfactuals to geographically proximate states (“close controls”), which poorly match treatment states' pre-treatment poverty trends, and (4) accounting for potential bias caused by heterogeneous and dynamic treatment effects. Using data spanning nearly four decades from the March Current Population Survey and a dynamic difference-in-differences (DiD) approach, we find that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage is associated with a (statistically insignificant) 0.17 percent increase in the probability of longer-run poverty among all persons. With 95% confidence, we can rule out long-run poverty elasticities with respect to the minimum wage of less than -0.129. Our null results persist across a variety of DiD estimation strategies, including two-way fixed effects, stacked DiD, Callaway and Sant'Anna, and synthetic DiD. We conclude that, to date, the preponderance of evidence suggests that minimum wage increases are an ineffective policy strategy for alleviating poverty.