We propose a new class of risk measures which satisfy convexity and monotonicity, two well-accepted axioms a reasonable and realistic risk measure should satisfy. Through a nonlinear weight function, the new measure can flexibly reflect the investor’s degree of risk aversion, and can control the fat-tail phenomenon of the loss distribution. A realistic portfolio selection model with typical market frictions taken into account is established based on the new measure. Real data from the Chinese stock markets and American stock markets are used for empirical comparison of the new risk measure with the expected shortfall risk measure. The in-sample and out-of-sample empirical results show that the new risk measure and the corresponding portfolio selection model can not only reflect the investor’s risk-averse attitude and the impact of different trading constraints, but can find robust optimal portfolios, which are superior to the corresponding optimal portfolios obtained under the expected shortfall risk measure.

We examine the evolution of accounting regulation by linking disclosure policies and investments in a dynamic voting model. The disclosure policies are the outcome of voting by entrepreneurs, whose preferences are influenced by their investments. The investments are in turn endogenously determined by current and future disclosure policies. Absent external influences, accounting regimes are stable. A disclosure regime of high (low) quality and a strong (weak) economy coexist and reinforce each other. However, regulatory interventions can result in regime changes by changing the entrepreneurs’ expectations, even without direct enforcement. Unexpected shocks could also result in regime changes by impacting economic conditions and hence voter composition. Our analysis provides a framework to study the interaction between accounting regulation and firms’ economic decisions.

We build a general equilibrium model to examine the implications of prospect theory for the disposition effect, asset prices, and trading volume. Diminishing sensitivity predicts a disposition effect, price momentum, a reduced return volatility, and a positive return-volume correlation. Loss aversion generally predicts the opposite. In calibrated economies, there is a nontrivial range of preference parameters for prospect theory to simultaneously explain the disposition effect, the momentum effect, and the equity premium puzzle. Our model is helpful for understanding a wide range of financial phenomena and it also suggests new testable predictions.

The dynamic minimum variance hedge ratios (MVHRs) have been commonly estimated using the Bivariate GARCH model that overlooks the basis effect on the time-varying variance–covariance of spot and futures returns. This paper proposes an alternative specification of the BGARCH model in which the effect is incorporated for estimating MVHRs. Empirical investigation in commodity markets suggests that the basis effect is asymmetric, i.e., the positive basis has greater impact than the negative basis on the variance and covariance structure. Both in-sample and out-of-sample comparisons of the MVHR performance reveal that the model with the asymmetric effect provides greater risk reduction than the conventional models, illustrating importance of the asymmetric effect when modeling the joint dynamics of spot and futures returns and hence estimating hedging strategies.

To understand the link between financial intermediation activities and the real economy, we build a general equilibrium model in which agency frictions in the financial sector affect the efficiency of capital reallocation across firms and generate aggregate economic fluctuations. We develop a recursive policy iteration approach to fully characterize the nonlinear equilibrium dynamics and the off-steady-state crisis behavior. In our model, adverse shocks to agency frictions exacerbate capital misallocation and manifest themselves as variations in total factor productivity at the aggregate level. Our model endogenously generates countercyclical volatility in the aggregate time series and countercyclical dispersion in the marginal product of capital and asset returns in the cross-section.

We investigate an alternative economic channel of a positive relationship between risk and compensation, as documented by Cheng et al. (2015). We propose that when information asymmetry exists, firms generally seek to use compensation as a signal of their CEOs’ ability. The risks arising from information asymmetry tend to encourage firms to pay higher compensation to their CEOs in a pattern of financial incentives we call the “Lake Wobegon effect”. However, when individual firms pursue complete signaling, a higher equilibrium compensation level can be achieved. This paper explores the factors that give rise to the “Lake Wobegon effect” and the learning process by which this effect can be counterbalanced over time (Hayes and Schaefer, 2009).

This study investigates the relationship between internet penetration and venture capital (VC) investment in China. Exploiting staggered inclusion in demonstration cities under the Broadband China strategy as a positive shock to internet penetration, our difference-in-differences analysis shows that this policy shock results in an increase in VC investments in demonstration cities relative to others. Moreover, the increase in VC investments is concentrated in early stage financing and young start-ups. In terms of VC fund sources, we find a stronger effect on foreign and independent VCs. Our mechanism analysis suggests that the effect of the broadband rollout is mainly driven by cities with higher ex-ante costs of information acquisition and that such costs are reduced by the improvement of internet-based network infrastructure. Finally, we provide additional evidence on the benefits to established companies by showing that broadband rollout improves the information environment of listed firms. Our study sheds new light on the economic consequences of infrastructure development that reduces information acquisition costs in China.

We combine national accounts, surveys, and new tax data to study the accumulation and distribution of income and wealth in China from 1978 to 2015. The national wealth-income ratio increased from 350 percent in 1978 to 700 percent in 2015, while the share of public property in national wealth declined from 70 percent to 30 percent. We provide sharp upward revision of official inequality estimates. The top 10 percent income share rose from 27 percent to 41 percent between 1978 and 2015; the bottom 50 percent share dropped from 27 percent to 15 percent. China’s inequality levels used to be close to Nordic countries and are now approaching US levels.