Farre-Mensa, Michaely and Schmalz (2018) document that many firms issue new equity to finance their payouts to shareholders, despite the substantial cost of equity issuance. We find that equity-financed payouts are related to institutional investors’ horizon. Specifically, firms with a larger ownership by short-horizon institutions are more likely to have equity-financed discretionary payouts, and firms with equity-financed discretionary payouts tend to cut down their investments in the following years. Our results suggest that investor short-termism has significant effects on firms’ payout, financing and investment policies.

Using a large sample of firms from 43 markets, we find significant time-series variation in firms’ leverage ratios around the world. Industry median leverage ratios and aggregate leverage ratios also change substantially over time. Relative to actual leverage ratios, target leverage ratios estimated from the time-varying target models are much more stable. Variance decomposition shows that leverage instability is largely driven by deviations from the target. A number of firm and market characteristics are related to capital structure instability. We also find evidence consistent with firms using financing activities to adjust their leverage ratios towards the target in global markets.