Prior studies show that comment letters released by the Securities and Exchange Commission provide information on firms’ financial reporting quality and can have adverse value implications about the firms. We examine whether short sellers front-run comment letter disclosures and take short positions based on the economic implications of the letters. We find that short interest increases before comment letter disclosures and that the increase is positively associated with the severity of the letters. We also find evidence suggesting that short sellers obtain private information through social connections with corporate insiders. Finally, we document a negative but delayed market reaction to the disclosure of severe comment letters. These results suggest that front running the comment letter disclosure is not the optimal trading strategy for short sellers. Short sellers can gain similar profits, and bear less risk, if they put off increasing their short positions until after the disclosure.

This paper examines the association between CEOs' prosocial tendency and their firms' likelihood of accounting manipulation. We measure CEOs' prosocial tendency based on their involvement with charitable organizations. We find that prosocial CEOs are less likely to engage in accounting manipulation, as proxied by material non‐reliance restatements and SEC or US Department of Justice enforcement actions. The effect is more pronounced when CEOs are involved with charities that directly aim to improve the welfare of others and when they face stronger incentives to misreport. These results continue to hold in analyses of changes in CEOs' prosocial tendency around turnover events. Taken together, our findings suggest that CEOs' prosocial tendency, a fundamental personal trait, plays a significant role in shaping the quality of accounting information.