Present-biased preferences engender a demand for commitment. Commitment is a problematic prediction, since we see so little of it. I quantitatively explore the reasons for the “missing” commitment. Extending the procrastination model in Carroll et al. (2009), I show how equilibrium commitment is related to (i) the standard deviation of the opportunity cost of time, (ii) the cost of delay, (iii) the degree of partial naivete, and (iv) the direct cost of commitment. The calibrated model demonstrates that the perceived benefits of commitment are often overwhelmed by the costs of commitment. Demand for commitment is a special case rather than the general case.

We study the effect of monetary and fiscal policy in a heterogeneous-agent model where households have present-biased time preferences and naive beliefs. The model features a liquid asset and illiquid home equity, which households can use as collateral for borrowing. Because present bias substantially increases households’ marginal propensity to consume (MPC), present bias increases the effect of fiscal policy. Present bias also amplifies the effect of monetary policy, but at the same time, slows down the speed of monetary transmission. Interest rate cuts incentivize households to conduct cash-out refinances, which become targeted liquidity injections to high-MPC households. Present bias also introduces a motive for households to procrastinate refinancing their mortgages, which slows down the speed with which this monetary channel operates.

Extending Barro (

Behavioral economics has become an important and integrated component of modern economics. Behavioral economists embrace the core principles of economics—optimization and equilibrium—and seek to develop and extend those ideas to make them more empirically accurate. Behavioral models assume that economic actors try to pick the best feasible option and those actors sometimes make mistakes. Behavioral ideas should be incorporated throughout the first-year undergraduate course. Instructors should also considering allocating a lecture (or more) to a focused discussion of behavioral concepts. We describe our approach to such a lecture, highlighting six modular principles and empirical examples that support them.

We combine two experiments and a survey to measure trust and trustworthiness—two key components of social capital. Standard attitudinal survey questions about trust predict trustworthy behavior in our experiments much better than they predict trusting behavior. Trusting behavior in the experiments is predicted by past trusting behavior outside of the experiments. When individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness rise. Trustworthiness declines when partners are of different races or nationalities. High status individuals are able to elicit more trustworthiness in others.

We review research that measures time preferences-i.e., preferences over intertemporal tradeoffs. We distinguish between studies using financial flows, which we call "money earlier or later" (MEL) decisions and studies that use time-dated consumption/effort. Under different structural models, we show how to translate what MEL experiments directly measure (required rates of return for financial flows) into a discount function over utils. We summarize empirical regularities found in MEL studies and the predictive power of those studies. We explain why MEL choices are driven in part by some factors that are distinct from underlying time preferences.

We conduct an experiment to evaluate why individuals invest in high-fee index funds. In our experiments, subjects allocate $10,000 across four S&P 500 index funds and are rewarded for their portfolio's subsequent return. Subjects overwhelmingly fail to minimize fees. We can reject the hypothesis that subjects buy high-fee index funds because of bundled non-portfolio services. Search costs for fees matter, but even when we eliminate these costs, fees are not minimized. Instead, subjects place high weight on annualized returns since inception. Fees paid decrease with financial literacy. Interestingly, subjects who choose high-fee funds sense they are making a mistake.

We identify employees at seven companies whose 401(k) investment choices are dominated because they are contributing less than the employer matching contribution threshold despite being vested in their match and being able to make penalty-free 401(k) withdrawals for any reason because they are older than 59½. At the average firm, 36% of match-eligible employees over 59½ forego arbitrage profits that average 1.6% of their annual pay, or $507. A survey educating employees about the free lunch they are foregoing raised contribution rates by a statistically insignificant 0.67 percent of income among those completing the survey.

Consistent with mental accounting, we document that investors sometimes choose the asset allocation for one account without considering the asset allocation of their other accounts. The setting is a firm that changed its 401(k) matching rules. Initially, 401(k) enrollees chose the allocation of their own contributions, but the firm chose the match allocation. These enrollees ignored the match allocation when choosing their own-contribution allocation. In the second regime, enrollees simultaneously selected both accounts' allocations, leading them to mentally integrate the two. Own-contribution allocations before the rule change equal the combined own- and match-contribution allocations afterwards, whereas combined allocations differ sharply across regimes.

The directed cognition model assumes that agents use partially myopic option-value calculations to select their next cognitive operation. The current paper tests this model by studying information acquisition in two experiments. In the first experiment, information acquisition has an explicit financial cost. In the second experiment, information acquisition is costly because time is scarce. The directed cognition model successfully predicts aggregate information acquisition patterns in these experiments. When the directed cognition model and the fully rational model make demonstrably different predictions, the directed cognition model better matches the laboratory evidence.