We offer evidence that interest rate spreads on syndicated loans to corporate borrowers are economically significantly smaller in Europe than in the United States, other things equal. Differences in borrower, loan, and lender characteristics do not appear to explain this phenomenon. Borrowers overwhelmingly issue in their natural home market and bank portfolios display home bias. This may explain why pricing discrepancies are not competed away, though their causes remain a puzzle. Thus, important determinants of loan origination market outcomes remain to be identified, home bias appears to be material for pricing, and corporate financing costs differ across Europe and the United States.

This paper traces the evolution of extreme illiquidity discounts among Treasury securities during the financial crisis; bonds fell more than six percent below more-liquid but otherwise identical notes. Using high-resolution data on market quality and trader identities and characteristics, we find that the discounts amplify through feedback loops, where cheaper, less-liquid securities flow to investors with longer horizons, thereby increasing their illiquidity and thus their appeal to these investors. The effect of the widened liquidity gap on transactions costs is further amplified by a surge in the price liquidity providers charged for access to their balance sheets in the crisis.