Much financial activity is zero-sum. While providing transactional and diversification services to others, participants also prey upon each other. High-ability predators trade opportunistically with less-able prey. In our dynamic model these features amplify real shocks. The presence of more low-ability traders reduces expected losses to high-ability traders, leading to equilibria with high levels of financial activity and employment. Shocks to profits can motivate exit by low-ability traders, rendering those of intermediate skill more vulnerable. Thus, our relatively simple model generates boom-bust dynamics suggestive of Wall Street.

Swedish government lottery bonds have coupon payments determined by lottery. They offer a unique opportunity to study a security with uncertain payoffs having a known, observable distribution. The risk associated with the lotteries is idiosyncratic by construction and should not command a risk premium in equilibrium. The bonds are traded in two forms, allowing us to evaluate the rewards to bearing extra lottery risk. Despite its idiosyncratic nature, we find prices appear to reflect aversion to this risk. We evaluate the empirical determinants of this differential pricing and possible explanations for it.

In models where both investors and securities are subject to differential taxation, there may be no set of prices that rule out infinite gains to trade, or "tax arbitrage."This paper characterizes the joint restrictions on financial-asset returns and investors' tax schedules that preclude tax arbitrage in the absence of short-sale constraints.The authors show that, if there exists any configuration of marginal tax rates on investors' tax schedules that rule out infinite gains to trade, then "no-tax-arbitrage" prices will exist.They also show that the existence of "no-tax-arbitrage" prices ensures the existence of equilibrium prices. THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENTIAL taxation on the equilibrium prices of financial assets have attracted much attention from financial economists in recent years.Otherwise identical securities that contribute to taxable income to different degrees will, in general, be valued differently by taxable investors.As a result, tax considerations have been useful in helping explain the effect of dividend yield on stock returns,' the effect of coupon levels and term to maturity on bond prices,2 the timing of investors' portfolio transactions,3 and the observed capital structures of firms.4While a rich set of observed behaviors can be better understood by reference to differential taxation, there are well-known difflculties in dealing with taxes in a general-equilibrium setting.To clear markets, relative prices must reflect the marginal rates of substitution of all agents simultaneously.When tax rates differ across investors, however, this condition can be impossible to achieve.To illustrate, consider a world of perfect certainty with two assets: a tax-exempt municipal bond and a taxable government bond.To equate marginal rates of substitution, the rate of return on the government bond, rg, must equal that on the municipal, rm, "grossed up" by one minus the investor's marginal tax rate, ti; that is, rg = rm/( 1 -ti).If there are investors in more than one tax bracket, this condition will obviously be impossible to satisfy for all of them simultaneously.

We present a simple model that rationalizes performance persistence in hedge fund limited partnerships. In contrast to the model for mutual funds of Berk and Green (2004), the learning in our model pertains to profitability associated with an innovative trading strategy or emerging sector, rather than ability specific to the fund manager. As a result of potential information spillovers, which would increase competition if informed investors were to partner with non-incumbent managers, incumbent managers will let informed investors benefit from increases in estimated profitability following high returns realized with the trading strategy or in the sector.

We derive and test a dynamic discrete-time model of asset returns. Both the risks of individual securities and equilibrium risk premia change predictably in the model, but these changes can be attributed to movements in the returns and prices of only two well-diversified portfolios. Any other components of returns should be unpredictable. Using the generalized method of moments, the model is estimated and tested on portfolios of equities. We find the data supportive of the model’s restrictions, even when instruments designed to capture the January effect are employed.

We show that firms intermediating trade have incentives to overinvest in financial expertise. In our model, expertise improves firms’ ability to estimate value when trading a security. Expertise creates asymmetric information, which, under normal circumstances, works to the advantage of the expert as it deters opportunistic bargaining by counterparties. This advantage is neutralized in equilibrium, however, by offsetting investments by competitors. Moreover, when volatility rises the adverse selection created by expertise triggers breakdowns in liquidity, destroying gains to trade and thus the benefits that firms hope to gain through high levels of expertise.

We study price discovery in municipal bonds, an important OTC market. As in markets for consumer goods, prices “rise faster than they fall.” Round‐trip profits to dealers on retail trades increase in rising markets but do not decrease in falling markets. Further, effective half‐spreads increase or decrease more when movements in fundamentals favor dealers. Yield spreads relative to Treasuries also adjust with asymmetric speed in rising and falling markets. Finally, intraday price dispersion is asymmetric in rising and falling markets, as consumer search theory would predict.

As a consequence of optimal investment choices, a firm's assets and growth options change in predictable ways. Using a dynamic model, we show that this imparts predictability to changes in a firm's systematic risk, and its expected return. Simulations show that the model simultaneously reproduces: (i) the time‐series relation between the book‐to‐market ratio and asset returns; (ii) the cross‐sectional relation between book‐to‐market, market value, and return; (iii) contrarian effects at short horizons; (iv) momentum effects at longer horizons; and (v) the inverse relation between interest rates and the market risk premium.

The advance refunding of debt is a widespread practice in municipal finance. In an advance refunding, municipalities retire callable bonds early and refund them with bonds with lower coupon rates. We find that 85% of all advance refundings occur at a net present value loss, and that the aggregate losses over the past 20 years exceed $15 billion. We explore why municipalities advance refund their debt at loss. Financially constrained municipalities may face pressure to advance refund since it allows them to reduce short‐term cash outflows. We find strong evidence that financial constraints are a major driver of advance refunding activity.