Knowledge that Transforms

textabstractThis survey may be opened with some apologetic remarks. The first is that to write a complete survey would mean to write a book. This has not been the intention of the editor, nor does it lie within the power of the present writer. Therefore, this survey is, in principle, incomplete, as will be easily seen by the many important authors whose work is not here discussed. The second remark is that a survey like this is, of necessity, one-sided and restricted. It is one-sided by reason of the special view of the writer on what is interesting and what is not; as, for example,this survey shows special interest in quantitative problems. It is restricted as a consequence of the fact that knowledge of nearly every individual about subjects more removed is less than about subjects in his direct neighborhood-both in a concrete and an abstract sense. The third remark relates to the subdivision of the material; it is difficult to represent, in a one-dimensional exposition, as the current text of a paper, a thing of multi-dimensional character.

It is generally accepted that the internal and external situation in 1929 posed contradictory demands with respect to monetary policy. According to Currie this is an erroneous point of view. Both the international and national situations of that time demanded the withdLdwa1of monetary restrictions. This, along with the maintenance of relatively stable prices and level of economic activity, could have partially prevented the consequences of a world recession. The argument for maintaining the monetary restriction was the rise in speculation. Nevertheless, it is fl0t clear chat speculation harmed productive investment or much less that it was an important cause of the recession In fact, and contrary to general opinion that maintained that the excesses of the "boom" were to blame for the gravity of the depression, the author shows that the Le was neither a ·'boom" nor inflation during the 1920s. This was, rather, a time of stability. The deficiencies of monetary policy, the concludes, were greatly responsible far originating the crisis. By concentrating primarily on stopping Speculation, the analysis of the level of economic activity as a whole was neglected. Far from preventing the recession, this served to set it off.