Knowledge that Transforms

If price discrimination is realized, the economy shifts from one equilibrium to another. It clearly involves welfare effects: The price-discriminator clearly gains, some consumers may also gain from the price cut, but others may lose faced with higher prices, etc. Traditionally the change in social welfare is known to be closely related to the change in total output. In the case of third-degree price discrimination, it is well known that an increase in total output is a necessary condition for welfare improvement. Richard Schmalensee (1981) proves this fact in a model in which the monopolist with constant marginal cost can perfectly separate markets. Further, Hal R. Varian (1985) extends this result to the case of interdependent markets, permnitting increasing marginal cost of the monopolist. And finally, the assumption of nondecreasing marginal cost is eliminated by Marius Schwartz (1990). Roughly speaking, this proposition says that if there is a welfare gain from price discrimination, there has to be some gain to offset the distortion involved. On the other hand, the vast majority of legal and other policy disputes over the price discrimination concern input markets, not final good markets. Thus, it seems important to investigate the situation in which a discriminating monopolist is not a final good supplier but an input supplier, and the buyers of the input are downstream producers of a final good, as is assumed in this paper. If the downstream firms have different technologies, their input demand functions will be different, and thus the monopolist has an incentive to price-discriminate. In this scenario, Michael L. Katz (1987) and Patrick DeGraba (1990) study the effect of inputmarket price discrimination, and show that price discrimination always lowers welfare because it involves the distortion that a lower-cost downstream firm is assigned a higher price. Unfortunately, in their simple settings on the technology of downstream industry, price discrimination can never change total output (of the input or of the final good).1 Thus we must say that welfare effect of input-market price discrimination remains open to question if it has some effect on total output. In particular, we are curious as to whether we can obtain some close relationship between the changes in welfare and total output as we have obtained in the final good market settings. With this motivation, we will construct a model which involves change in total output (of the final good). In the next section, the model and assumptions are provided. In Section II, after we extend the result of Katz (1987) and DeGraba (1990), we find a relationship between the changes in welfare and total output. Strikingly, it states that an increase in the total output of the final good is a sufficient condition for welfare deterioration. This result contrasts with that obtained by Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985), and Schwartz (1990) from usual models of price discrimination in a final good market. Section III concludes the analysis.

Tiebout choice among districts is the most powerful market force in American public education. Naive estimates of its effects are biased by endogenous district formation. I derive instruments from the natural boundaries in a metropolitan area. My results suggest that metropolitan areas with greater Tiebout choice have more productive public schools and less private schooling. Little of the effect of Tiebout choice works through its effect on household sorting. This finding may be explained by another finding: students are equally segregated by school in metropolitan areas with greater and lesser degrees of Tiebout choice among districts.

This paper examines the role for tax policies in productivity-shock driven economies with catching-up-with-the-Joneses utility functions. The optimal tax policy is shown to affect the economy countercyclically via procyclical taxes, i.e., “cooling down” the economy with higher taxes when it is “overheating” in booms and “stimulating” the economy with lower taxes in recessions to keep consumption up. Thus, models with catching-up-with-the-Joneses utility functions call for traditional Keynesian demand-management policies but for rather unorthodox reasons.

Asset Markets: How They Are Affected by Tournament Incentives for Individuals by Duncan James and R. Mark Isaac. Published in volume 90, issue 4, pages 995-1004 of American Economic Review, September 2000

Economies of Scale and Constant Returns to Capital: A Neglected Early Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth by Edmund S. Cannon. Published in volume 90, issue 1, pages 292-295 of American Economic Review, March 2000

Everyone has observed people invoking fair-ness arguments in defense of their opinions or actions, and it is not uncommon for such argu-ments to be wielded on both sides of an issue about which views conflict. For example, dur-ing a televised debate Representative Charles B. Rangel said, “I think [Affirmative Action] has to involve a search for fairness, ” whereas com-mentator Avi Nelson opined that “you promote more unfairness than fairness when you depart from the basic criterion, which is that individ-uals should be treated as individuals ” (Annen-

A Theory of Rigid Extremists and Flexible Moderates with an Application to the U.S. Congress by S. Brock Blomberg and Joseph E. Harrington. Published in volume 90, issue 3, pages 605-620 of American Economic Review, June 2000

The paper takes the search and matching model of the aggregate labor market to the data. It tests the model's empirical validity and employs structural estimation to generate a characterization of the optimal behavior of firms and workers. The model is applied to Israeli data that are uniquely suited for this kind of empirical investigation. The structural estimates are used to quantify the frictions embodied in the model, including the costs of search, the congestion and trading externality effects, and the matching process. A calibration-simulation analysis then studies the effect of several key variables on equilibrium unemployment.

Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon by Joseph Henrich. Published in volume 90, issue 4, pages 973-979 of American Economic Review, September 2000