Knowledge that Transforms

In recent years, an increasing portion of bank income has been generated through nontraditional activities. Most studies of bank efficiency do not include any measure of nontraditional activities when measuring outputs. In this paper, cost, revenue, and profit efficiency are estimated by using models with and without nontraditional output. The results suggest that the standard model which omits nontraditional output understates bank efficiency. Evidence also surfaces that based on efficiency, the relative ranking of individual banks changes when nontraditional activities are included as a type of output.

We study a dynamic economy endowed with a sequence of overlapping generations of consumers and production processes, and where productive assets are illiquid and consumption preferences are subject to uninsurable demand for liquidity. We characterize the steady states that can be achieved with alternative financial systems. We show that infinitely lived financial intermediaries offering a liability with age-dependent restrictions may implement a social optimum with full insurance. If, instead, they offer anonymous, unrestricted contracts, then only second-best consumption allocations with partial insurance obtain. We also examine the consumption allocations available when agents can trade shares in competitive stock markets. While allowing for trade across generations may or may not improve upon generational autarky, we show that this competitive equilibrium is not a social optimum, and is dominated by a system of infinitely lived, unrestricted intermediaries.

It is known that deviating from the one-share–one-vote principle through the issue of non-voting stock increases the value of outsiders' voting rights. We argue that the creation of a business group is another way to deviate from one-share–one-vote and we show that it produces a larger voting-share premium in holding companies. As a consequence, having both subsidiaries and non-voting stock produces a multiplier effect on the voting premium. The puzzling size of the premium in Italy was never related to the interaction of pyramiding and non-voting stock. Our empirical study confirms that the premium is larger for holding companies issuing non-voting stock than for similar operating companies without non-voting equity.

This study analyses the comparison between a traditional statistical methodology for bankruptcy classification and prediction, i.e. linear discriminant analysis (LDA), and an artificial intelligence algorithm known as Genetic Algorithm (GA). The study was carried out at Centrale dei Bilanci, in Turin, Italy, analysing 1920 unsound and 1920 sound industrial Italian companies from 1982–1995. This paper follows our earlier examination of neural networks (NN) (see Altman et al., 1994. Corporate distress diagnosis: Comparisons using discriminant analysis and neural network. Journal of Banking and Finance XVIII, 505–529). The experiments on GA were oriented along two different lines: the genetic generation of linear functions and the genetic generation of scores based on rules. The two types of experiments showed GA to be a very effective instrument for insolvency diagnosis, even if the results obtained with LDA analysis perhaps proved to be superior to those obtained from GA. Of particular interest, it should be noted that the results of GA were obtained in less time and with more limited contributions from the financial analyst than the LDA. Of additional interest is the relevance for credit risk management of financial institutions.

We present estimates of how much bank loans and real activity in small businesses responded to changes in banks' capital conditions and other bank and aggregate economic conditions. Using data for 1989–1992 by state, we estimated the effects of those factors on employment, payrolls, and the number of firms by firm size, as well as on gross state product. In response to declines in their own bank capital, small banks shrank their loan portfolios considerably more than large banks did. Large banks tended to increase loans more when small banks were under increased capital pressure than vice versa. Real economic activity was reduced more by capital declines and by loan declines at small banks than at large banks. Small banks were making “high-powered loans” in that dollar-for-dollar loan declines in their loans had larger impacts on economic activity than loan declines at large banks did. Capital declines at small banks produced larger changes in economic activity dollar-for-dollar than capital declines at large banks did. Aggregate economic conditions had smaller effects on small firms than on large firms and smaller effects on small banks than on large banks. The evidence hinted that the volume of loans made under Small Business Administration (SBA) loan guarantee programs shrank less in response to declines in bank capital than the volume of loans not made under the SBA loan guarantee programs.

The objective of this paper is to address the issue of choosing between currency forward and currency futures contracts when hedging against currency risk within a stochastic interest rates environment. We compare between the hedging effectiveness of the two derivative assets both within a narrow sense (i.e., volatility minimization) and within a wide sense (i.e., risk-return trade-off). When judging hedging effectiveness in the narrow sense, forward and futures contracts give identical results even if they do not have identical prices. When judging hedging effectiveness in the wide sense, the choice between the two contracts is determined by the correlation between the domestic and the foreign term structures dynamics.

This study argues that an interest rate swap, as a non-redundant security, creates surplus which will be shared by swap counterparties to compensate their risks in swaps. This action in turns affects swap spreads. Analyzing the time series impacts of the changes of risks of swap counterparties on swap spreads, we conclude that both lower and higher rating bond spreads have positive impacts on swap spreads. We also derive a risk–spread relation to test if swap counterparties are firms with differential credit ratings. Since the risk allocation between swap counterparties varies over business cycles, hence this factor needs to be controlled. We conclude that (1) similar results hold if the business cycle factor is controlled and (2) swap spreads contain procyclical element and are less cyclical than lower credit rating bond spreads.