Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies the evolution of a competitive industry in which a fixed number of firms reduce costs by innovating and by imitating their rivals' technologies. As the firms' technologies gradually improve, industry output expands and price falls. Technological leaders tend to rely on innovations to reduce their costs, whereas the laggards rely more on imitation. Imitation causes technology to spread from the leaders to the followers and forces some convergence of technology among firms as the industry matures. This convergence is accompanied by faster growth of smaller firms and a consequent tightening of the distribution of output over firms. Since imitation is a kind of spillover of technology, equilibrium is likely to involve insufficient innovative and imitative effort relative to a social optimum.

Using a game-theoretic approach, we examine possible equilibrium explanations of the often-observed phenomenon that two neighboring restaurants offering similar menus nevertheless experience vastly different demands. The essential aspect of this analysis is the presence of a consumption externality that makes the popularity itself a factor in the determination of the relative attractiveness of the restaurants.

U.S. beef cattle stocks are among the most periodic economic time series. A theory of cattle cycles is constructed on the basis of breeding stock inventory decisions. The low fertility rate of cows and substantial lags and future feedback between fertility and consumption decisions cause the demographic structure of the herd to respond cyclically to exogenous shocks in demand and production costs. Known demographic parameters of cattle imply sharp numerical benchmarks for the resulting dynamic system and closely compare with independent econometric time-series estimates over the 1875-1990 period. The model fits extremely well.

Though it is routinely posited that organizations with different property rights will not exhibit the same responses to changes in their economic environment, compelling evidence of such behavior is difficult to find. We collected observations on two types of firms--conventional proprietorships and worker-owned cooperatives--operating in the same industry, in the same location, and at the same period of time. We compare the firms' reactions to changes in their input and output prices and ask whether their reactions are consistent with orthodox models of profit and dividend maximization.

The California One-Variety Cotton Law is an important example of technological regulation, in this case intended to serve as a de facto quality control and to mitigate externalities in production that can arise from the mixing of cottonseed at the gin. This paper describes and interprets the economic history of the law, presents a theoretical model of its economic effects, and provides quantitative estimates of the impacts on output, prices, and economic welfare, following a partial deregulation under a 1978 amendment to the law. The analysis shows that large social costs have arisen from concentrating control over the genetic base for California cotton production in the hands of a single government cotton breeder and restricting production to the use of a single selection of a single variety. Some of these costs have been eliminated by the partial deregulation in 1978 to permit private breeders to compete in the provision of genetic material, but production is still restricted to the Acala variety of cotton. While the regulation has benefited some, perhaps even a majority, of the industry participants, it has been increasingly harmful to some other growers and costly overall. The persistence of this costly regulation may be due to the distribution of its impacts: the partial deregulation yielded large increases in aggregate producer surplus but many growers experienced small losses.

Most markets clear through a sequence of sales rather than through a Walrasian auctioneer. Because buyers can decide whether to buy now or later, rather than only now or never, their current "willingness to pay" is much more sensitive to price than the demand curve is. A consequence is that markets will be extremely sensitive to new information, leading to both "frenzies," in which demand feeds on itself, and "crashes," in which price drops discontinuously. The paper also shows how a result from static auction theory, the revenue equivalence theorem, can be applied to solve for a dynamic price path.

This paper modifies the modern explanation of Giffen behavior by incorporating the classical emphasis on subsistence. Specifically, the calculated redirection of consumption priorities by those reduced to subsistence income levels is embodied in the utility function, and the biological necessity of consuming sufficient nutrition to support health is modeled as a subsistence constraint. This methodology is then applied to the potato culture that existed in Ireland prior to the 1845-48 famine. It is suggested that the evolution of this culture was shaped by subsistence-driven behavior similar to the behavior that underlies the Giffen effect.

This study estimates a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function using market data and microeconometric methods. We investigate the decision whether to purchase insurance against the risk of telephone line trouble in the home. Using the choices of approximately 10,000 residential customers, we determine the shape of the utility function and the degree of risk aversion. We find that risk aversion varies systematically in the population and varies with the level of income and that the observed choice behavior is consistent with expected utility maximization.

The semiconductor industry is often cited as a "strategic" industry in part because important learning-by-doing spillovers may justify special industrial policies. Documenting the precise nature of these spillovers is crucial for determining the advisability of such policies and is helpful for understanding the contribution of learning to endogenous growth. Yet existing empirical evidence on learning by doing in semiconductor production is scant and evidence on spillovers is nonexistent. Using quarterly, firm-level data on seven generations of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) semiconductors over 1974-92, we find that (a) learning rates average 20 percent, (b) firms learn three times more from an additional unit of their own cumulative production than from an additional unit of another firm's cumulative production, (c) learning spills over just as much between firms in different countries as between firms within a given country, (d) Japanese firms are indistinguishable from others in learning speed, and (e) intergenerational learning spillovers are weak, being marginally significant in only two of seven DRAM generations.

We develop a model in which a large investor has access to a costly monitoring technology affecting securities' expected payoffs. Allocations of shares are determined through trading among risk-averse investors. Despite the free-rider problem associated with monitoring, risk-sharing considerations lead to equilibria in which monitoring takes place. Under certain conditions the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient and all agents hold the market portfolio of risky assets independent of the specific monitoring technology. Otherwise distortions in risk sharing may occur, and monitoring activities that reduce the expected payoff on the market portfolio may be undertaken.