Knowledge that Transforms

Global aging is prompting workers and taxpayers everywhere to recognize their vulnerability to the inherent uncertainty of unfunded social-security systems. This has generated an international wave of social-security reforms over the last two decades, prompting more than 20 countries to establish Individual Account (IA) plans. In the United States, the idea of Individual Accounts has attracted recent interest with the release of the Final Report of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security (CSSS): here, voluntary individual accounts were proposed as a key element of a reformed national old-age system (see Commission to Strengthen Social Security, 2001; John F. Cogan and Mitchell, 2003). Strengths of IA's include the fact that participants gain ownership in their accounts and diversify their pension investments; nevertheless, IA participants also must bear capital-market risk. Recent market volatility has reminded investors of the importance of capital-market fluctuations and their potential impact on retirement income. In response, some policymakers have suggested that "guarantees" be designed to help protect IA investments. Abroad, such guarantees have been adopted in several Latin American countries undergoing reform, and most recently, in Japan and Germany (Mitchell and Kent Smetters, 2003). Sensible public policy recommending the adoption of guarantees must identify their costs and who will pay for them. In this paper, we discuss how to evaluate such costs in the context of a social-security reform that includes IA's, along with ways to finance them.

Forms of Intolerance held in early September 2001 was unfortunately obscured by the tragic events of September 11. Nonetheless, the event reflects global recognition of problems of racial, ethnic and cultural discrimination, oppression and exploitation. The following analysis, inspired by participation in collaborative international research presented to the Conference, suggests that economic discrimination may be usefully seen in terms of rents and rent-seeking. By successfully discriminating against a particular group, employers or consumers succeed in extracting rents from the group discriminate against. However, such rents are different in nature. Discriminated employees (e.g. Blacks) receive lower remuneration or inferior terms of employment. Successful discrimination allows employers to use their availability to extract additional ‘producer surplus ’ by conceding lower (‘intermediate’-level) wages or employment conditions to ostensibly privileged employees (e.g. Whites), than might be the case in the absence of discrimination. Even if there is an eventual equalization of wage rates or employment conditions between the group discriminated against and the privileged group, a ‘producer surplus ’ from the poorer wages or employment conditions may well persist

In this paper we do two things. First we document that over the last 40 years the U.S. business cycle has become less synchronized with the cycle in the rest of the world. Second we try to explain why this has happened. We use a general-equilibrium model as a tool to discriminate between two alternative explanations: (i) a change in the nature of real shocks, and (ii) an increase in U.S. financial integration with the rest of the world. Our results indicate that financial integration has played the major role in producing the observed changes in international co-movement.

Economic theory and evidence from a variety of debt markets shed light on current reform proposals concerning emerging market debt. Debt markets, including the U.S. municipal bond market, generally function best when the rights of creditors are protected most effectively.

The general conclusion of the empirical literature is that in-market consolidation generates adverse price changes, harming consumers. Previous studies, however, look only at the short-run pricing impact of consolidation, ignoring effects that take longer to materialize. Using a database that includes detailed information on the deposit rates of individual banks in local markets for different categories of depositors, we investigate the long-run price effects of mergers. We find strong evidence that, although consolidation does generate adverse price changes, these are temporary. In the long run, efficiency gains dominate over the market power effect, leading to more favorable prices for consumers.

Procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers. Motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are unverifiable, if innovators cannot benefit directly by marketing their innovations, and if the buyer cannot extract up-front payments from suppliers. We study the use of contests to procure an innovation in such an environment. An auction in which two suppliers are invited to innovate and then bid their prizes is optimal in a large class of contests. If contestants are asymmetric, it is optimal to handicap the most efficient one.

The Instructional Use and Teaching Preparation of Graduate Students in U.S. Ph.D.-Granting Economics Departments by William B. Walstad and William E. Becker. Published in volume 93, issue 2, pages 449-454 of American Economic Review, May 2003

This paper investigates the effects of lobbying by corporations when investments are irreversible and government cannot commit to tax policies. We show that industries which rely more heavily on sunk capital lobby more vigorously and are generally more successful in obtaining tax breaks. Thus lobbying can mitigate the capital levy problem. Nevertheless, these industries invest less in long-run equilibrium than more flexible ones. We then consider the effects of relaxing legal restrictions on corporate lobbying. When the deadweight costs of lobbying fall, taxes on sunk capital tend to fall, but political contributions may rise, as lobbyists compete more intensively for political favors. On balance, a ban of lobbying may therefore cause investment to rise or fall.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Because of the Depression’s place in both the popular and academic imagination, and the repeated and justifiable emphasis on output that was not produced, income that was not earned, and expenditure that did not take place, it will seem startling to propose the following hypothesis: the years 1929–1941 were, in the aggregate, the most technologically progressive of any comparable period in U.S. economic history.1 The hypothesis entails two primary claims: that during this period businesses and government contractors implemented or adopted on a more widespread basis a wide range of new technologies and practices, resulting in the highest rate of measured peacetime peak-to-peak multifactor productivity growth in the century, and secondly, that the Depression years produced advances that replenished and expanded the larder of unexploited or only partially exploited techniques, thus providing the basis for much of the labor and multifactor productivity improvement of the 1950’s and 1960’s.