Knowledge that Transforms

The welfare cost of free public schools is the difference between the cost of those schools and the maximum parents would be willing to pay to send their children to those schools. Estimates based on data from California school districts in 1970 indicate that this welfare cost is substantial, mostly because private schools are cheaper per unit of quality than public schools.

The objective of this paper is to investigate the "conventional wisdom" that there is a policy conflict between the reduction of inequality and the encouragement of entrepreneurial risk taking. The paper attempts to provide a precise statement of this conflict in the context of the progressivity of tax regimes. Using the method of inequality decomposition analysis, a taxonomy is developed which locates the sources of the policy conflict in a precise fashion. A detailed analysis then shows that the conventional wisdom is misleading if not wrong, and that in many cases the claimed policy conflict is quite simply illusory.

Responses to questions given to a random sample of Michigan households are used to estimate public spending demand functions. While income and price elasticities are similar to those obtained from aggregate data, positive income elasticities appear to arise because public services are distributed in a prorich manner. A relatively small variance in spending demands among urban and suburban communities in metropolitan areas with substantial public service variety suggests that the Tiebout mechanism works. This interpretation is supported by the fact that actual spending conforms substantially to desired levels in urban areas, but less so in rural areas with little public sector choice.

The permanent income hypothesis with rational expectation is restated, estimated, and tested by an instrumental variables technique on the postwar U.S. aggregate time-series data. The hypothesis is accepted on a consumption series which includes service flows from consumer durables. If the consumption series is the one in the National Income and Product Accounts, the hypothesis is decisively rejected. An explanation is suggested to reconcile the conflicting test results.

In 1873 there appeared in Danish an essay by two Danish mathematicians, Frederik Bing and Julius Petersen. This essay has received almost no attention, yet it appears on close inspection to be a strikingly original and path-breaking contribution to neoclassical distribution theory. A detailed exposition of the authors' theory and some of their applications is presented in the light of an interpretive model expressed in modern terms. A concluding section gives some information about the authors and attempts to assess their contribution and its claims to a significant place in the history of economic analysis.

This paper propses directly unproductive, profit-seeking (DUP) activities as a general concept that embraces a wide range of recently analyzed economic activities, including the subset of rent-seeking activities considered by Krueger. It then proceeds to provide a synthesis and generalization of the welfare-theoretic analysis of such activities by developing a fourfold categorization of cases depending on the levels of distortions before and after the DUP activity. Thus a unification and overview of the subject are achieved.

[Informational asymmetries can play a key role in explaining the existence and nature of multiperiod contracts. In an illustrative risk-sharing model even relatively short (two-period) contracts can be mutually beneficial if there is private information, though one-period contracts suffice otherwise. Further, contracts which are Pareto optimal relative to the environment and the information structure are defined and partially characterized. An example illustrates how otherwise inefficient intertemporal tie-ins can be used optimally to mitigate incentive problems. The obvious borrowing-lending schemes are not private-information Pareto optimal; in these, period-by-period actions are not sufficiently constrained. Discounting affects the form of the optimal contract but none of these qualitative conclusions.]