We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players, but trust contracts that pay a generous wage up front are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts. These results are consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness, and incentives.
We provide a nonparametric characterization of a general collective model for household consumption, which includes externalities and public consumption. Next, we establish testable necessary and sufficient conditions for data consistency with collective rationality that only include observed price and quantity information. These conditions have a similar structure as the generalized axiom of revealed preference for the unitary model, which is convenient from a testing point of view. In addition, we derive the minimum number of goods and observations that enable the rejection of collectively rational household behavior.
The purpose of this paper is to provide theoretical justification for some existing methods for constructing confidence intervals for the sum of coefficients in autoregressive models. We show that the methods of Stock (1991), Andrews (1993), and Hansen (1999) provide asymptotically valid confidence intervals, whereas the subsampling method of Romano and Wolf (2001) does not. In addition, we generalize the three valid methods to a larger class of statistics. We also clarify the difference between uniform and pointwise asymptotic approximations, and show that a pointwise convergence of coverage probabilities for all values of the parameter does not guarantee the validity of the confidence set.
Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and, each unit of time, continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry. Traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter. Within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero, one, or more buyers. Every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and, if trade occurs, both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility. Traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched. We characterize the steady-state equilibria that are perfect Bayesian. We show that, as δ converges to zero, equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the Walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation. We also show the existence of equilibria for δ sufficiently small, provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation costs. Copyright The Econometric Society 2007.
We propose a simple method to help researchers develop quantitative models of economic fluctuations. The method rests on the insight that many models are equivalent to a prototype growth model with time-varying wedges that resemble productivity, labor and investment taxes, and government consumption. Wedges that correspond to these variables—efficiency, labor, investment, and government consumption wedges—are measured and then fed back into the model so as to assess the fraction of various fluctuations they account for. Applying this method to U.S. data for the Great Depression and the 1982 recession reveals that the efficiency and labor wedges together account for essentially all of the fluctuations; the investment wedge plays a decidedly tertiary role, and the government consumption wedge plays none. Analyses of the entire postwar period and alternative model specifications support these results. Models with frictions manifested primarily as investment wedges are thus not promising for the study of U.S. business cycles.
This paper proposes a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses to incomplete-information games based on “level-k” thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete-information games. We derive the model's implications in first- and second-price auctions with general information structures, compare them to equilibrium and Eyster and Rabin's (2005) “cursed equilibrium,” and evaluate the model's potential to explain nonequilibrium bidding in auction experiments. The level-k model generalizes many insights from equilibrium auction theory. It allows a unified explanation of the winner's curse in common-value auctions and overbidding in those independent-private-value auctions without the uniform value distributions used in most experiments.
In this article we introduce efficient Wald tests for testing the null hypothesis of the unit root against the alternative of the fractional unit root. In a local alternative framework, the proposed tests are locally asymptotically equivalent to the optimal Robinson Lagrange multiplier tests. Our results contrast with the tests for fractional unit roots, introduced by Dolado, Gonzalo, and Mayoral, which are inefficient. In the presence of short range serial correlation, we propose a simple and efficient two-step test that avoids the estimation of a nonlinear regression model. In addition, the first-order asymptotic properties of the proposed tests are not affected by the preestimation of short or long memory parameters.
This paper establishes that instruments enable the identification of nonparametric regression models in the presence of measurement error by providing a closed form solution for the regression function in terms of Fourier transforms of conditional expectations of observable variables. For parametrically specified regression functions, we propose a root n consistent and asymptotically normal estimator that takes the familiar form of a generalized method of moments estimator with a plugged-in nonparametric kernel density estimate. Both the identification and the estimation methodologies rely on Fourier analysis and on the theory of generalized functions. The finite-sample properties of the estimator are investigated through Monte Carlo simulations.
This study reports evidence from a field experiment that was conducted to investigate the relevance of gift exchange in a natural setting. In collaboration with a charitable organization, we sent roughly 10,000 solicitation letters to potential donors. One-third of the letters contained no gift, one-third contained a small gift, and one-third contained a large gift. Treatment assignment was random. The results confirm the economic importance of gift exchange. Compared to the no gift condition, the relative frequency of donations increased by 17 percent if a small gift was included and by 75 percent for a large gift. The study extends the current body of research on gift exchange, which is almost exclusively confined to laboratory studies.
This paper applies some general concepts in decision theory to a simple instrumental variables model. There are two endogenous variables linked by a single structural equation; k of the exogenous variables are excluded from this structural equation and provide the instrumental variables (IV). The reduced-form distribution of the endogenous variables conditional on the exogenous variables corresponds to independent draws from a bivariate normal distribution with linear regression functions and a known covariance matrix. A canonical form of the model has parameter vector (ρ, φ, ω), where φis the parameter of interest and is normalized to be a point on the unit circle. The reduced-form coefficients on the instrumental variables are split into a scalar parameter ρand a parameter vector ω, which is normalized to be a point on the (k−1)-dimensional unit sphere; ρmeasures the strength of the association between the endogenous variables and the instrumental variables, and ωis a measure of direction. A prior distribution is introduced for the IV model. The parameters φ, ρ, and ωare treated as independent random variables. The distribution for φis uniform on the unit circle; the distribution for ωis uniform on the unit sphere with dimension k-1. These choices arise from the solution of a minimax problem. The prior for ρis left general. It turns out that given any positive value for ρ, the Bayes estimator of φdoes not depend on ρ; it equals the maximum-likelihood estimator. This Bayes estimator has constant risk; because it minimizes average risk with respect to a proper prior, it is minimax. The same general concepts are applied to obtain confidence intervals. The prior distribution is used in two ways. The first way is to integrate out the nuisance parameter ωin the IV model. This gives an integrated likelihood function with two scalar parameters, φand ρ. Inverting a likelihood ratio test, based on the integrated likelihood function, provides a confidence interval for φ. This lacks finite sample optimality, but invariance arguments show that the risk function depends only on ρand not on φor ω. The second approach to confidence sets aims for finite sample optimality by setting up a loss function that trades off coverage against the length of the interval. The automatic uniform priors are used for φand ω, but a prior is also needed for the scalar ρ, and no guidance is offered on this choice. The Bayes rule is a highest posterior density set. Invariance arguments show that the risk function depends only on ρand not on φor ω. The optimality result combines average risk and maximum risk. The confidence set minimizes the average—with respect to the prior distribution for ρ—of the maximum risk, where the maximization is with respect to φand ω.