Knowledge that Transforms

As the exchange rate, foreign demand, production costs and export promotion policies evolve, manufacturing firms are continually faced with two issues: Whether to be an exporter, and if so, how much to export. We develop a dynamic structural model of export supply that characterizes these two decisions and estimate the model using plant-level panel data on Colombian chemical producers. The model embodies uncertainty, plant-level heterogeneity in export profits, and sunk entry costs for plants breaking into foreign markets. Our estimates, and the simulation exercises that they support, yield several implications. First, entry costs are typically large, but vary greatly across producers. Second, there is substantial cross-plant heterogeneity in gross expected export profit streams. Third, these large entry costs make expectations about future exporting conditions important for many producers, so changes in the exchange rate regime that are credible induce much more entry than those that are not. Fourth, however, most of the entry and exit takes place among marginal exporters who contribute little to aggregate export revenues. Finally, subsidies on export earnings have a much larger impact on export revenues (per dollar spent) than subsidies that reduce the entry costs faced by new

An extension to Ellsberg's experiment demonstrates that attitudes to ambiguity and compound objective lotteries are tightly associated. The sample is decomposed into three main groups: subjective expected utility subjects, who reduce compound objective lotteries and are ambiguity neutral, and two groups that exhibit different forms of association between preferences over compound lotteries and ambiguity, corresponding to alternative theoretical models that account for ambiguity averse or seeking behavior. Copyright The Econometric Society 2007.

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This paper analyzes equlibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies (games) with externalities, strategic complementarity or substitutability, and heterogenous information. First, we characterize the equilibrium use of information; complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information, raising aggregate volatility, whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information, cross-sectional dispersion. Next, we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective; the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents. Finally, we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure; the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency, if any, in the equilibrium use of information. We conclude with a few applications, including production externalities, beauty contests, business cycles, and large Cournot and Bertrand games.

Families, primarily female-headed minority households with children, living in high-poverty public housing projects in five U.S. cities were offered housing vouchers by lottery in the Moving to Opportunity program. Four to seven years after random assignment, families offered vouchers lived in safer neighborhoods that had lower poverty rates than those of the control group not offered vouchers. We find no significant overall effects of this intervention on adult economic self-sufficiency or physical health. Mental health benefits of the voucher offers for adults and for female youth were substantial. Beneficial effects for female youth on education, risky behavior, and physical health were offset by adverse effects for male youth. For outcomes that exhibit significant treatment effects, we find, using variation in treatment intensity across voucher types and cities, that the relationship between neighborhood poverty rate and outcomes is approximately linear. Copyright The Econometric Society 2007.

This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in settings with nondurable trading opportunities and complete but unverifiable information. The framework explicitly accounts for the parties' individual trade actions. The sets of implementable state-contingent payoffs, under various assumptions about renegotiation opportunities, are characterized and compared. The results indicate the benefit of modeling trade actions as individual, rather than as public, and they highlight the usefulness of a structured game-theoretic framework for applied research.

Nonseparable models do not impose any type of additivity between the unobserved part and the observable regressors, and are therefore ideal for many economic applications. To identify these models using the entire joint distribution of the data as summarized in regression quantiles, monotonicity in unobservables has frequently been assumed. This paper establishes that in the absence of monotonicity, the quantiles identify local average structural derivatives of nonseparable models.

This paper develops estimators for quantile treatment effects under the identifying restriction that selection to treatment is based on observable characteristics. Identification is achieved without requiring computation of the conditional quantiles of the potential outcomes. Instead, the identification results for the marginal quantiles lead to an estimation procedure for the quantile treatment effect parameters that has two steps: nonparametric estimation of the propensity score and computation of the difference between the solutions of two separate minimization problems. Root-N consistency, asymptotic normality, and achievement of the semiparametric efficiency bound are shown for that estimator. A consistent estimation procedure for the variance is also presented. Finally, the method developed here is applied to evaluation of a job training program and to a Monte Carlo exercise. Results from the empirical application indicate that the method works relatively well even for a data set with limited overlap between treated and controls in the support of covariates. The Monte Carlo study shows that, for a relatively small sample size, the method produces estimates with good precision and low bias, especially for middle quantiles.

This paper examines changes in the distribution of wages using bounds to allow for the impact of nonrandom selection into work. We show that worst case bounds can be informative. However, because employment rates in the United Kingdom are often low, they are not informative about changes in educational or gender wage differentials. Thus we explore ways to tighten these bounds using restrictions motivated from economic theory. With these assumptions, we find convincing evidence of an increase in inequality within education groups, changes in educational differentials, and increases in the relative wages of women.

Does individual behavior in a laboratory setting provide a reliable indicator of behavior in a naturally occurring setting? We consider this general methodological question in the context of eliciting risk attitudes. The controls that are typically employed in laboratory settings, such as the use of abstract lotteries, could lead subjects to employ behavioral rules that differ from the ones they employ in the field. Because it is field behavior that we are interested in understanding, those controls might be a confound in themselves if they result in differences in behavior. We find that the use of artificial monetary prizes provides a reliable measure of risk attitudes when the natural counterpart outcome has minimal uncertainty, but that it can provide an unreliable measure when the natural counterpart outcome has background risk. Behavior tended to be moderately risk averse when artificial monetary prizes were used or when there was minimal uncertainty in the natural nonmonetary outcome, but subjects drawn from the same population were much more risk averse when their attitudes were elicited using the natural nonmonetary outcome that had some background risk. These results are consistent with conventional expected utility theory for the effects of background risk on attitudes to risk.