Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the pricing behavior of securities of firms which repurchase their own shares. The results are consistent with a market in which investors price securities such that expected arbitrage profits are precluded. The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that firms offer premia for their own shares mainly in order to signal positive information, and that the market uses the premium, the target fraction and the fraction of insider holdings as signals in order to price securities around the announcement date. The observation that repurchases via tender offer are followed by abnormal increases in earnings per share and that mainly small firms engage in repurchase tender offers, provides further support for the signalling hypothesis.

This paper derives a call option valuation equation assuming discrete trading in securities markets where the underlying asset and market returns are bivariate lognormally distributed and investors have increasing, concave utility functions exhibiting skewness preference. Since the valuation does not require the continouus time riskfree hedging of Black and Scholes, nor the discrete time riskfree hedging of Cox, Ross and Rubinstein, market effects are introduced into the option valuation relation. The new option valuation seems to correct for the systematic mispricing of well-in and well-out of the money options by the Black and Scholes option pricing formula.

This paper consolidates the results of some recent work on the relation between forward prices and futures prices. It develops a number of propositions characterizing the two prices. These propositions contain several testable implications about the difference between forward and futures prices. Many of the propositions show that equilibrium forward and futures prices are equal to the values of particular assets, even though they are not in themselves asset prices. The paper then illustrates these results in the context of two valuation models and discusses the effects of taxes and other institutional factors.

Both the Roll and the Geske equations for the valuation of the American call option on a stock with known dividends are incorrectly specified. This note presents the corrected valuation formula, explains the misspecifications and provides a numerical example.

The study examines the impact of convertible security calls on securityholder's wealth. On average common stock values fall by approximately two percent at the announcements of convertible debt calls, but common stockholder's wealth is unaffected by convertible preferred stock calls. These findings are consistent with a corporate tax effect. A small average decrease in firm value is also found at the announcements of convertible debt calls. The study raises, but leaves unanswered, the interesting question of what motivates managers to make capital structure decisions that reduce stockholder wealth and firm value.

The paper examines the optimal behavior of a single dealer who is faced with a stochastic demand to trade (modeled by a continuous time Poisson jump process) and facing return risk on his stock and on the rest of his portfolio (modeled by diffusion processes). Using stochastic dynamic programming, we derive the optimal bid and ask prices that maximize the dealer's expected utility of terminal wealth as a function of the state in which he finds himself. The relationship of the bid and ask prices to inventory of the dealer, instantaneous variance of return, stochastic arrival of transactions and other variables is examined.

Miller and Scholes have shown that under certain conditions the Federal Income Tax taxes dividend income at a rate no higher than the rate on capital gains. Tabulations of actual 1977 tax returns show that the special circumstances under which this can occur apply to recipients of two and one half percent of dividend income and that no dominant role may therefore be ascribed to their hypothesis in the determination of corporate dividend policy.

This study examines the empirical relationship between the return and the total market value of NYSE common stocks. It is found that smaller firms have had higher risk adjusted returns, on average, than larger firms. This ‘size effect’ has been in existence for at least forty years and is evidence that the capital asset pricing model is misspecified. The size effect is not linear in the market value; the main effect occurs for very small firms while there is little difference in return between average sized and large firms. It is not known whether size per se is responsible for the effect or whether size is just a proxy for one or more true unknown factors correlated with size.

This paper is designed to provide additional evidence on the positive theory of accounting policy choice by combining individual accounting principles into firm income strategies. These strategies were the dependent variable in a probit analysis where the independent variables were size, management compensation, industry concentration ratio, systematic risk, capital intensity and the total debt to total asset ratio. The results indicate that four of these factors (size, management compensation, concentration ratio, and the total debt to total asset ratio) have a significant association with the choice of a firm's income strategy. This test provides strong evidence consistent with the positive theory of accounting standard setting/choice. We also present evidence that smaller firms and/or firms in less concentrated industries do not appear to make accounting policy choice decisions that are consistent with this theory.

Portfolios are formed directly and exclusively upon residual return behavior in the months prior to portfolio formation. The empirical behavior of residual return in the post-formation period is then examined. Based upon the overall time period studied (1932 through 1977), the average residual return is essentially zero in the months subsequent to the portfolio formation. However, systematic (i.e., non-zero) residual behavior is observed in particular years. Moreover, the results suggest the possibility that ‘abnormal’ returns observed after certain events (e.g., earnings announcements) may at least in part reflect more general phenomena associated with being ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in terms of residual returns in the months previous to the event.