[This paper examines the existence conditions of an oligopolistic equilibrium. We use the Cournot concept (the strategies are the production levels) in a partial equilibrium framework. We allow for U-shaped average cost curves and nonidentical firms. We show that an equilibrium exists if the demand is large. The main part of the proof is a new fixed point theorem for a class of noncontinuous mappings.]
This paper reexamines both monthly and quarterly U.S. postwar data to investigate if the observed comovements between money, real interestrates, prices and output are compatible with the money-real interest-output link suggested by existing monetary theories of output, which include both Keynesian and equilibrium models.The major empirical findings are these;1) In both monthly and quarterly data, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the ex ante real rate is exogenous, or Granger-causally prior in the context of a four-variable system which contains money, prices, nominal interest rates and industrial production.2) In quarterly data, there is significantly more information con-tained in either the levels of expected inflation or the innovationof this variable for predicting future output, given current and lagged output, than in any other variable examined (money, actualinflation, nominal interest rates, or ex ante real rates). The effect of an inflation innovation on future output is unambiguously negative. The first result casts strong doubt on the empirical importance of existing monetary theories of output, which imply that money should have a causal role on the ex ante real rates. The second result would appear incompatible with most demand driven models of output.In light of these results, we propose an alternative structural model which can account for the major dynamic interactions among the variables.This model has two central features: i) output is unaffected by money supply;and ii) the money supply process is motivated by short-run price stability.
ABSTRACT We extend the standard finance model of the firm's dividend/investment/financing decisions by allowing the firm's managers to know more than outside investors about the true state of the firm's current earnings. The extension endogenizes the dividend (and financing) announcement effects amply documented in recent research. But once trading of shares is admitted to the model along with asymmetric information, the familiar Fisherian criterion for optimal investment becomes time inconsistent: the market's belief that the firm is following the Fisher rule creates incentives to violate the rule. We show that an informationally consistent signalling equilibrium exists under asymmetric information and the trading of shares that restores the time consistency of investment policy, but leads in general to lower levels of investment than the optimum achievable under full information and/or no trading. Contractual provisions that change the information asymmetry or the possibility of profiting from it could eliminate both the time inconsistency and the inefficiency in investment policies, but these contractual provisions too are likely to involve dead‐weight costs. Establishing which route or combination of routes serves in practice to maintain consistency remains for future research.
ABSTRACT One of the most significant and unique features in Kahneman and Tversky's approach to choice under uncertainty is aversion to loss realization. This paper is concerned with two aspects of this feature. First, we place this behavior pattern into a wider theoretical framework concerning a general disposition to sell winners too early and hold losers too long. This framework includes other elements, namely mental accounting, regret aversion, self‐control, and tax considerations. Second, we discuss evidence which suggests that tax considerations alone cannot explain the observed patterns of loss and gain realization, and that the patterns are consistent with a combined effect of tax considerations and the three other elements of our framework. We also show that the concentration of loss realizations in December is not consistent with fully rational behavior, but is consistent with our theory.
ABSTRACT Research in experimental psychology suggests that, in violation of Bayes' rule, most people tend to “overreact” to unexpected and dramatic news events. This study of market efficiency investigates whether such behavior affects stock prices. The empirical evidence, based on CRSP monthly return data, is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Substantial weak form market inefficiencies are discovered. The results also shed new light on the January returns earned by prior “winners” and “losers.” Portfolios of losers experience exceptionally large January returns as late as five years after portfolio formation.