We examine the change in the value of the underlying stock associated with long-term option introduction. Analysis of the abnormal returns associated with LEAPS (Long-Term Equity Anticipation Security) introductions indicates a decline in firm value even after we control for the endogenous nature of the listing decision. However, the evidence does not support previously-offered explanations for the price change associated with option introductions. In particular, we do not find the predicted relations between the cumulative abnormal returns and variables associated with loosening of short sale constraints such as beta, proxies for the dispersion in investor beliefs, and change in relative short interest.

This paper tries to explain why the issuers of an asset would restrict what information is available about their asset. In a world where knowledge is valued, market forces should induce disclosure, but we often see markets (such as the market for mortgage-backed securities) where assets' issuers refuse to release valuable information. We present a model of market liquidity and find that market liquidity can both rise and fall with the quantity of released information. More information may increase asymmetries of information and “lemons” style breakdowns. We find that asset bundling is more advantageous when private information is more accurate, which may be the case in the mortgage-backed securities market.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G14, G32.

This paper examines the change in trading costs for firms that choose to move from a dealer market to a specialist system. Using transactions data, our empirical results reveal structurally induced average trading cost reductions of 4.7 (5.2) cents per share for firms that moved from the NASDAQ/NMS to the NYSE (AMEX) in 1990. For NYSE listed stocks, the trading cost reductions are equally divided between quote improvements and the routing of trades to the NYSE. Trading cost improvements vary inversely with trade sizes and positively with dollar spreads. Finally, the greatest liquidity benefits from listing accrue to the less liquid stocks. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D40, G12, G20.

Previous research documents differences in trading desk skills across management companies that result in significant variation in execution costs. In this paper, we utilize links between management companies and their institutional clients to explore variation in execution costs within management companies. For a subset of management companies, we find that systematic differences in execution costs exist across clients; these differences are comparable to the variation documented across management companies and persist over time. Clients who receive lower execution costs reward management companies with an increase in dollar trading volume. We find no evidence that the results are driven by broker commissions or differences in trading practices. Given the economic significance of our findings and implications for institutional investors, this aspect of execution should be recognized regardless of the ultimate source of the differences.

This paper investigates why traders hide their orders and how other traders respond to hidden depth. Using a logit model, we provide empirical findings suggesting that traders use hidden orders to manage both exposure risk and picking off risk. Using probit models, we show that hidden depth increases order aggressiveness. Our interpretation of this empirical evidence is threefold. First, hidden depth detection is possible and frequent. Second, when traders detecthidden volume at the best opposite uote, they strategically adjust their order submission to seize the opportunity for depth improvement. Third, traders' response when hidden depth is detected suggests either that they do not associate hidden orders with informed trading or that the risk of trading with an informed trader is widely offset by the opportunity for depth improvement.

We use a mean-variance approach to address the classic puzzle of British capital export in the 19th century. Our analysis shows that foreign securities listed in London offered significant diversification benefits to British investors. In simple terms, international diversification reduced risk. Conservative estimates of the optimal investment portfolio for a domestic investor suggest that the balance between foreign and domestic security offerings on the London Exchange was close to what classic equilibrium models of asset prices would suggest.

To short a stock, an arbitrageur must first borrow it. This paper describes the market for borrowing and lending U.S. equities, emphasizing the conditions generating and sustaining short-sale constraints. A large institutional lending intermediary provided eighteen months (4/2000–9/2001) of data on loan supply (“shortability”), loan fees (“specialness”), and loan recalls. The data suggest that while loan market specials and recalls are rare on average, the incidence of these short-sale constraints is increasing in the divergence of opinion among investors. Beyond some threshold, investor optimism itself can limit arbitrage via the loan market mechanism.

This paper examines the agency problem between shareholders and debtholders of Japanese and U.S. firms. Whereas U.S. institutional investors are restricted from doing so, Japanese financial institutions take large equity positions in firms to which they lend, particularly in firms more susceptible to the agency problem. Debt ratios of U.S. firms are negatively related to the firm's potential to engage in risky, suboptimal investments, whereas Japanese debt ratios show no such relation. The evidence is consistent with the notion that the agency problem is mitigated to a greater degree in Japan than in the U.S.

This paper examines call behavior of corporate issuers of non-convertible bonds. Evidence from a sample of 102 calls indicates that the market value of the called bonds is usually below the call price at the time of the announcement. The stock price reactions to call announcements are positively related to the direction of the change in leverage. When the call relaxes restrictive covenants, the firm on average pays a larger premium to call debt. The premium is a minimum estimate of the potential opportunity costs of restrictive covenants.