Knowledge that Transforms

Hires occur for two reasons - to grow a business and to replace those who have left (churn). Churn is an important part of employment dynamics, allowing workers to move to their most productive use. We present evidence on churn from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). Churn is procyclical. During the 2007-09 recession, four-fifths of hiring reductions are associated with reduced churn, not with reductions in job creation. We estimate that the cost of reduced churn is about two-fifths of a percentage point of GDP annually throughout the three-and-one-half year period since the beginning of the recession.

We propose a new strategy for a pervasive problem in the hedonics literature: recovering hedonic prices in the presence of time-varying correlated unobservables. Our approach relies on an assumption about home buyer rationality, under which prior sales prices can be used to control for time-varying unobservable attributes of the house or neighborhood. Using housing transactions data from California's Bay Area between 1990 and 2006, we apply our estimator to recover marginal willingness to pay for reductions in three of the EPA's “criteria” air pollutants. Our findings suggest that ignoring bias from time-varying correlated unobservables considerably understates the benefits of a pollution reduction policy.

This paper develops a model of industry dynamics where firms compete to acquire customers over time by disseminating information about themselves in the presence of random shocks to their efficiency. The properties of the model's stationary equilibrium are related to empirical regularities on firm and industry dynamics. As an application of the model, the effects of a decline in the cost of information dissemination on firm and industry dynamics are explored.

We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner’s dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were “lenient” in not retaliating for the first defection, and many were “forgiving” in trying to return to cooperation after inflicting a punishment.

There are many alleged culprits for the bank runs of 2008 and their devastating economic fallout. But proprietary information and leverage top our list. Claims of proprietary information forced financial markets to operate on trust, while providing the perfect breeding ground for fraud. And leverage permitted creditors to run at the first whiff of fraud, leveling one financial giant after another. Limited Purpose Banking (LPB), presented here, is a financial reform that sharply curtails proprietary information and eliminates leverage and, thus, the possibility of financial collapse. LPB's adoption is supported by our simple model showing how fraud can destroy finance.

In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this class of problems. Under acyclicity, we characterize dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and obtain two general insights. First, a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently powerful groups. Second, efficiency-enhancing changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender. We use this framework to analyze dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views.

Asian countries still have the IMF stigma, which originates from the experiences of the Asian crisis of 1997-98. The feeling of being unfairly treated grew even stronger afterward. The Asian countries built large foreign reserves, carried out structural reforms, and became even stronger than pre- crisis period. Asians are confident in not repeating the same mistake of falling into a crisis with too much external borrowing. Whether IMF can entice Asia to new precautionary liquidities facilities remains uncertain. Asia may choose either to focus on completing a regional safety net or to engage in IMF, demanding for a greater voice and votes.

The paper proposes a theory of efficient perceptual distortions, in which the statistical relation between subjective perceptions and the objective state minimizes the error of the state estimate, subject to a constraint on information processing capacity. The theory is shown to account for observed limits to the accuracy of visual perception, and then postulated to apply to perception of options in economic choice situations as well. When applied to choice between lotteries, it implies reference-dependent valuations, and predicts both risk-aversion with respect to gains and risk-seeking with respect to losses, as in the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).

We study prisoners' dilemmas played in continuous time with flow payoffs accumulated over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation is about 90 percent. Control sessions with repeated matchings over eight subperiods achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases, and, with one-second subperiods, they approach continuous levels. Our data support a strand of theory that explains how capacity to respond rapidly stabilizes cooperation and destabilizes defection in the prisoner's dilemma.

Premiums in health insurance markets frequently do not reflect individual differences in costs, either because consumers have private information or because prices are not risk rated. This creates inefficiencies when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple econometric model to study this problem and estimate it using data on small employers. We find a welfare loss of 2-11 percent of coverage costs compared to what is feasible with risk rating. Only about one-quarter of this is due to inefficiently chosen uniform contribution levels. We also investigate the reclassification risk created by risk rating individual incremental premiums, finding only a modest welfare cost.