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Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy

American Economic Review 2014 104(5), 431-435
We study the design of mechanisms satisfying a novel desideratum: privacy. This requires the mechanism not reveal 'much' about any agent's type to other agents. We propose the notion of joint differential privacy: a variant of differential privacy used in the privacy literature. We show by construction that mechanisms satisfying our desiderata exist when there are a large number of players, and any player's action affects any other's payoff by at most a small amount. Our results imply that in large economies, privacy concerns of agents can be accommodated at no additional 'cost' to standard incentive concerns.

Labor Supply and Household Dynamics

American Economic Review 2014 104(5), 354-359
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we provide evidence that to understand household decisions and evaluate policies designed to affect individual welfare, it is important to add an intertemporal dimension to the by-now standard static collective models of the household. Specifically, we document that the observed differences in labor supply by gender and marital status do not arise suddenly at the time of marriage, but rather emerge gradually over time. We then propose an intertemporal collective model that has the potential of explaining the observed patterns.

Multiproduct Search and the Joint Search Effect

American Economic Review 2014 104(9), 2918-2939 open access
This paper presents a sequential search model where consumers look for several products from multiproduct firms. Multiproduct search can significantly influence firms' pricing decisions. For example, it can make market prices decrease with search costs. Possible applications of the model are also discussed.

A Test of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing

American Economic Review 2014 104(11), 3397-3433 open access
We collect a new dataset on capital punishment in the United States and we propose a test of racial bias based upon patterns of sentence reversals. We model the courts as minimizing type I and II errors. If trial courts were unbiased, conditional on defendant's race the error rate should be independent of the victim's race. Instead we uncover 3 and 9 percentage points higher reversal rates in direct appeal and habeas corpus cases, respectively, against minority defendants who killed whites. The pattern for white defendants is opposite but not statistically significant. This bias is confined to Southern states.

Does the US Labor Market Reward International Experience?

American Economic Review 2014 104(5), 250-254 open access
A typical strategy for measuring the returns to international experience--comparing the earnings of returning migrants to comparable non-migrants--has been criticized for not adequately accounting for self-selection. I suggest an alternative, testing whether individuals born beyond US borders, but into US citizenship, earn more in US labor markets relative to counterparts born on US soil. Those born abroad to US citizens did not self-select an international experience. Using the ACS, I find that the US market rewards international experience, especially in occupations that value creativity and innovation. Women, in particular, are handsomely rewarded for international human capital.

Industry Compensation under Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

American Economic Review 2014 104(8), 2482-2508 open access
When regulated firms are offered compensation to prevent them from relocating, efficiency requires that payments be distributed across firms so as to equalize marginal relocation probabilities, weighted by the damage caused by relocation. We formalize this fundamental economic logic and apply it to analyzing compensation rules proposed under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, where emission permits are allocated free of charge to carbon-intensive and trade-exposed industries. We show that this practice results in substantial overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk. Efficient permit allocation reduces the aggregate risk of job loss by more than half without increasing aggregate compensation.

E-lections: Voting Behavior and the Internet

American Economic Review 2014 104(7), 2238-2265
This paper analyzes the effects on voting behavior of information disseminated over the Internet. We address endogeneity in Internet availability by exploiting regional and technological peculiarities of the preexisting voice telephony network that hindered the roll-out of fixed-line infrastructure for high-speed Internet. We find negative effects of Internet availability on voter turnout, which we relate to a crowding-out of TV consumption and increased entertainment consumption. We find no evidence that the Internet systematically benefits specific parties, suggesting ideological self-segregation in online information consumption. Robustness tests, including placebo estimations from the pre-Internet period, support a causal interpretation of our results.

Unilateral Divorce, the Decreasing Gender Gap, and Married Women's Labor Force Participation

American Economic Review 2014 104(5), 342-347
Married women's labor force participation (LFP) increased dramatically in the United States between the 1940 and 1960 cohort. The two cohorts lived under different divorce regimes (unilateral divorce rather than mutual consent). The 1960 cohort also had a lower gender wage gap. We use a quantitative dynamic life-cycle model of endogenous marital status, calibrated to key statistics for the 1940 cohort, to study the effects of these two changes. We find that both drivers combined are able to account for over 50 percent of the increase in married women's LFP and also generate large movements in marriage and divorce rates.

Measuring the Effect of the Zero Lower Bound on Medium- and Longer-Term Interest Rates

American Economic Review 2014 104(10), 3154-3185
According to standard macroeconomic models, the zero lower bound greatly reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy and increases the efficacy of fiscal policy. However, private-sector decisions depend on the entire path of expected future short-term interest rates, not just the current short-term rate. Put differently, longer-term yields matter. We show how to measure the zero bound's effects on yields of any maturity. Indeed, 1- and 2-year Treasury yields were surprisingly unconstrained throughout 2008 to 2010, suggesting that monetary and fiscal policy were about as effective as usual during this period. Only beginning in late 2011 did these yields become more constrained.

Consume Now or Later? Time Inconsistency, Collective Choice, and Revealed Preference

American Economic Review 2014 104(12), 4147-4183 open access
We develop a revealed preference methodology that allows us to explore whether time inconsistencies in household choice are the product of individual preference nonstationarities or the result of individual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the household. An empirical application to household-level microdata highlights that an explicit recognition of the collective nature of household choice enables the observed behavior to be rationalized by a theory that assumes preference stationarity at the individual level. The methodology created in this paper also facilitates the recovery of theory-consistent discount rates for each individual within particular household under study.