Knowledge that Transforms

In this paper, we examine the effects of economic cycles on low-to moderate-income families. We use variation across states and over time to estimate the effects of cycles on the distribution of income, using fine gradations of the household income-to-poverty ratio. We also explore how the effects of cycles affect the risk of falling into poverty across demographic groups, focusing on age, race/ethnicity, and family type. We conclude by testing to see whether these relationships have changed in the Great Recession. We discuss the results in light of the changes in the social safety net in recent decades.

This paper analyzes how asset prices in a binary market react to information when traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs. We show that the competitive equilibrium price underreacts to information when there is a bound to the amount of money traders are allowed to invest. Underreaction is more pronounced when prior beliefs are more heterogeneous. Even in the absence of exogenous bounds on the amount that traders can invest, prices underreact to information provided that traders become less risk averse as their wealth increases. In a dynamic setting, underreaction results in initial momentum and then reversal in the long run.

This paper examines the implicit health insurance that households receive from the ability to declare bankruptcy. Exploiting multiple sources of variation in asset exemption law, I show that uninsured households with a greater financial cost of bankruptcy make higher out-of-pocket medical payments, conditional on the amount of care received. In turn, I find that households with greater wealth at risk are more likely to hold health insurance. The implicit insurance from bankruptcy distorts the insurance coverage decision. Using a microsimulation model, I calculate that the optimal Pigovian penalties are three-quarters as large as the average penalties under the Affordable Care Act.

We provide new evidence on the effect of the unemployment insurance (UI) weekly benefit amount on unemployment insurance spells based on administrative data from the state of Missouri covering the period 2003-2013. Identification comes from a regression kink design that exploits the quasi-experimental variation around the kink in the UI benefit schedule. We find that UI durations are more responsive to benefit levels during the recession and its aftermath, with an elasticity between 0.65 and 0.9 as compared to about 0.35 pre-recession.

We ask whether past macro-economic and bank-specific shocks experienced and survived by a bank affect its current capitalization and risk-taking. Using Call Report data from 1984 to 2010, we find that a bank's experience shapes its capital structure and risk appetite. Banks that have survived periods of undercapitalization tend to implement higher equity ratios and take less risk in the periods following such crises, as measured by net charge-offs, non-performing loans, or earnings volatility 10-25 years later. However, observing high rates of failure among other banks stirs banks in the opposite direction. The evidence is suggestive of institutional memory affecting banks' capital and risk-taking.

When entry is exogenous, strong buyers should be discriminated against weak buyers to maximize revenues (Myerson 1981). When entry is endogenous so that entrants' expected payoffs do not depend on the proposed mechanism, optimal discrimination takes a completely different form. The revenue-maximizing equilibrium requires that there should be no discrimination with respect to entrants irrespective of their ex ante characteristics. Besides, those buyers who always participate should be discriminated against entrants independently of their strength. These predictions are independent of the equilibrium selection when the number of potential entrants grows large. The optimality of first-price auctions is also discussed.

We marketed a training program for lower level managers (line supervisors) to large factories in the Bangladeshi ready-made garment industry. Take-up of the program (even for a free slot) was low, due to intense production pressures, fire-fighting and concerns over retention of trained workers. Take-up is quite insensitive to pricing. There was higher interest and demand in training modules aimed at improving production processes and quality, rather than human resources and social compliance. Since the program was priced close to a commercially viable rate, it might be possible to develop a market provided they could be proved to be effective.

We propose a new abstract definition of equilibrium in the spirit of competitive equilibrium: a profile of alternatives and a public ordering (expressing prestige, price, or a social norm) such that each agent prefers his assigned alternative to all lower-ranked ones. The equilibrium operates in an abstract setting built upon a concept of convexity borrowed from convex geometry. We apply the concept to a variety of convex economies and relate it to Pareto optimality. The “magic” of linear equilibrium prices is put into perspective by establishing an analogy between linear functions in the standard convexity and “primitive orderings” in the abstract convexity.

Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly discloses quality information in wholesale automobile auctions. We argue that buyers in this market are horizontally differentiated across cars that are vertically ranked by quality. This implies that information disclosure helps match heterogeneous buyers to cars of varying quality, causing both good and bad news to increase competition and revenues. The data confirm these hypotheses. These findings have implications for the design of other markets, including e-commerce, procurement auctions, and labor markets.

We evaluate how intensified interior immigration enforcement impacts the likelihood that children of unauthorized immigrants will repeat a grade or drop out of school. Using a weighted index of the intensity of interior immigration enforcement at the MSA level, we find that increased enforcement has the largest impact on younger children ages 6 to 13. The estimates, which account for the non-random residential location of children and their families, reveal that increased enforcement raises young children's probability of repeating a grade by 6 percent and their likelihood of dropping out of school by 25.2 percent.